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INTRODUCTION

Today, even more than in the days of the Trojan War and
the quarrels hetv/een the Italian city states, the Straits of the
Dardanelles and the Bosphorus are a danger to world peace. The
Straits are important not only to the states hordering the Black
Sea for whom, in most cases, their Black Sea ports are their on-
ly sea-outlets and to all nations who ship their products dovm
the Danube, the Dnieper, the Don, or the Dniester Rivers into
the Black Sea, but also to outside povrers who ship their goods
into the Black Sea from the Mediterranean.
With the grovrbh of national states and large-scale pov/er
power politics, the control of the Straits acquired strategic
importance. After the invention of mines and long-range artil-
lery, it was comparatively easy for the country ruling ^onstanti
nople to control the Straits. Today, vrith airpov;er and more
formidable weapons than ever before, it is questionable how
effective such control of the Straits v7ould be. However, no
such test has yet taken place, and possession of the fortifica-
tions of the Straits is still coveted by interested pov/ers, even
though it may be obsolete in a military sense. Strategically,
too, the Straits are no longer two separate problems, as they
v:ere in the time of the Greeks, but one, together with the islan|^
of the Aegean Sea. The question of the control of the entrance
into the Black Sea or exit to the Mediterranean Sea is part of
a struggle going on between the "heartland" and the "periphery"
states for political supremacy in the Middle East and the Medi-
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7The question of the Straits, as one of the issues which
may lead to a third world v'ar if not successfully dealt with,
has become an international concern. It cannot be ignored as to 5
minor for attention. The solution in itself will certainly not
prevent v;ar, but a peaceful compromise for one of the differences
betvreen the major pov/ers might vrell lead tovjard others.
A study of the present regime of the Straits, hov; it came
about, hov; it has and is functioning, its applicability to the
futirre v/orld situation, is necessary to understand just where
the danger lies. This paper tries to present a comprehensive
picture of the main issues since 1936 — a brief historical
survey points out the place of the Dardanelles in earlier stru-
ggles for pov/er, the seeds of the present rivalry. The settle-
ment after the first VJorld VJ^ar and its ultimate inappropriateness,
while not a close parallel to the present situation, do shov; the
dynamic state of a political balance of pov/er. The Montreux
Conference itself depicts the making of compromises, the intense
feeling betv/een interested pov/ers, the type of dispute, the deli-
cate balance between a successful and a discordant conference.
The operation of the Montreux Convention during Vforld '*'ar II
and the real reasons for its successful function are also examin-
ed in detail. The grovrbh of the new Soviet move to control the
Straits, with its international repercussions, indicates the
tension which nov/ exists — the outcome of which has not yet
been detemined.
The sources for this paper have been wherever possible
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official or semi-official documents, but, in the more recent sec
b ions , newspapers and periodicals have been the source for both
iiplomatic correspondence and general public opinion. Finally,
the conclusions v/hich seem to follow from the facts have been
presented, including possibilities for settlement of the issue
their estimated chance of success.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND UP T0:.1918

The question of the Straits has shov/n its twofold aspect,
commercial and strategic, from the very beginning. The early
Sreeks collected tolls on passing merchant ships, and one of
thelimportant parts of their expansion was through the Straits
to the shores of the Black Sea. Vfhen the Romans took over the
control of the Straits, there v;as little concern over control
for strategic |)urposes since Rome ruled the ancient v/orld, but
trade v/as still carried on through the Straits. When the poli-
tical center of gravity moved to Constantinople, the more modern
phase of Straits history began. Outside nations vied with eash
other and v/ith the Greeks for trading privileges. The develop-
ment of Italy and, with it of Europe as whole, is said to have
been retarded for centuries by the struggle of jealous Mediter-
ranean states to gain a monopoly of the markets and control of
the Straits.
Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453, and lihe Straits
oecame Turkish property. In 1475, with the capture of Azov and
the Crimea, the Black Sea itself became a Turkish lake. It v/as
the established policy of the Ottoman Government to exclude all
foreign ships from the Black Sea by closing the Straits of the
Bosphorus. A series of treaties between the Western Powers and
the Ottoman Empire began in 1535 and, by the close of the eigh-
teenth century, through capitulations, nearly all the Christian
countries of Europe had gained recognition for the rights of
their citizens engaged in business v/ith the Tiu?ks. Although
a^i: ir/^orfa e.tu?iit6 erf^ to rtol^eax/p orTT
vI'XjP.s .^nii'inisad' ytisv 9riv+ .roi'i ^ oi : hna lBlo*X9:nnioo;
I
to srro bfCf. .E^x-rfa on 8rloT[Br:; aniss/iq no nXIOo J^9C^o&IXno BSloonO
ad-l^eioL orfd ii:iro*if(-t noienoqxs 'irarfd- to et'iijq ^ni-q'ioqmiis' erl^-'
f
j
’Bffcf T0VO :?foc:^ . oe'ri ^obI? ofu+ to ssToria ariJ o^’'
I Xo'iJnoo Tiovo riToonoo ssv.' B'xoxiiJ' r’iaifj'i&S oAt to .Co'xd'n
d-jLfrf ,JoIio'v d-nBtojciB e£i+ f>eX/.f*i omorf eonle oi:;:i9J’S‘io8 ‘xo’lr'
-Mog noflV/ .B^Xcnct : ofJ rl3X/o*xifq no bOi'izGo IIx*to ^^^: ebett
n*i9 hoc: o-rom orfq ,oIgorrj:inFl-anoD oo bavo:.: to *ietaoo Xeoi.ti
' XLO -19 xiq^v- bBlv snoxstnn obX'.vh/O .rrBj^ecf to ocBrig
-loXoveX srfT .3B-^oXi:viig tot odt rl;itvf bus 'r9flJa|
9Vf>d o * br^e aX .oXoiI'a' an ooo^q r *10 xiJX-' ,bnB yl-.qx 'io gnsi^-
i
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none of these treaties granted passage through the Bosphorus in-
to the Black Sea, the merchants of Europe did find their way in-
to the Black Sea, either by chaptering Turkish shipping or merelj*
by evading the restrictions.
At the end of the seventeenth century, Russia beean to
dhov7 an interest in the Black Sea trade, Peter the Great’s de-
mand for freedom of navigation on the Black Sea was refused by
the Turks, Under Catherine the Great, Russia established her
power along the Black Sea coast; the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji
of 1774 permitted for the first time free and unimpeded naviga-
tion officially for merchant ships of Russia in the Black Sea
and the Straits and possibly into the Mediterranean, This treat^’
opened the modern phase of the Straits question, and vras the ba-
sis for all further treaties intil the Crimean ’'far. After 1774,
the Ottoman Empire and then Turkey v:ere never again permitted to
control the Straits without interference from other powers. The
power most interested in this control was and still is Russia.
From the eighteenth century on, the history of the Straits shov;s
Russia's constant efforts to control them frustrated first by on^
pov^er and then another. Her aim was to build a Black Sea fleet
/vhich should have complete freedom of navigation through the St-
raits. In order to gain this, she v:ished to have effective poli-|
bical domination over Constantinople by direct conquest of the
Dttoman Empire, by establishing an exclusive protectorate over
the Sultanate, or by peaceful partition of Turkey, During the
Tzm
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nineteenth century, the duel v/as chiefly between the Russian
Bear and the British Lion, ’.'fhile the Sultan looked helplessly
on, there were numerous Russo-Turkish wars, and the Straits them*
selves became the subject of innumerable treaties, conventions,
and protocols, which were torn up as soon as they were signed.
England’s attention v/a[S first drawn to the strategic impor -
tance of the Straits during Napoleon's Egyptian expedition \7hen
the Russian fleet emerged at Turkey's request. In 1807, Alexan-
der of Russia tried to work out a partition scheme v/ith Napoleon
but the two leaders were unable to agree on the matter of Con-
stantinople and the Straits. Meamvhile, by the Peace of the
Dardanelles of 1809, Britain recognized the principle of closing
the Straits to ships of war in peacetime, the "ancient rule of
the Ottoman Empire", and in so doing became the guardian of the
( 1 )
Straits almost as much as Turkey.
Russia succeeded in strengthening her influence by forcing
Turkey, during the chaos of the Greek Wars for Independence, to
sign the Treaty of Ackerman in 18S6,by which Russia was granted
comnlete freedom "in all the seas and v/aters of the Ottoman Em-
( 2 )
pire without any exception" for its merchant shipping. A final
settlement w'as made by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829, which
5ave complete freedom to all Russian commercial vessels with the
idditional and unique proviso that no visit or search was to be
L. James T. Shotv/ell and Francis Deak, Turkey at the Straits,
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exercised over these vessels passing through the Straits and any
act interfering with this freedom the Turkish Government woul i
he met hy reprisals from the Russian Government, These tv7o Rus-
sian triumphs, hov^ever, were eclipsed hy the Treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi of 1833, V7hich contained a secret clause stating that
the Ottoman Empire vras t(2"limit its actions in favor of the Im-
perial Court of Russia to closing the Straits of the Dardanelles,
that is to say, not to permit any foreign shin of war to enter
(3)
therein under any pretext whatever.”
Hovrever, this virtual protectorate over Turkey was liqui-
dated hy the Treaty of London in 1840, V7hich, theoretically, vTas
dravm up hy the four powers Russia, Britain, Prussia, and Austrii
to protect Turkey and which restated the ancient rule of the Ot-
toman Empire that no ships of war were to he permitted to pass
through the Straits. For the first time a rule formerly recog-
nized only through bilateral treaties v/ith the Ottoman Empire
became a part of a general treaty; a year later France joined
the other powers in signing the Convention of the Straits, which
made the principle a part of European international lav7, I^he
Treaty of Paris in 1856, follovring the Crimean War in which Eng-
land and France defeated Russia, reaffirmed the Straits Conven-
tion of 1841, hut added the clause that each of the pov/ers might
send two light warships through the Straits for service at the







sea could be called "neutral", a term formerly applied only to
land in international law. This treaty v/as a decisive defeat
in Russia’s aim to use the Straits for her own protection, he-
causd in case of war, the Sultan was permitted to allow non-
Black Sea Po'wers entry through the Straits.
Russia did not intend to follov/ the Treaty of Paris any
longer than necessary; in 1870, she formally circulated a note
that she was no longer hound in respect to her sovereign rights
in the Black Sea. Her complaint resulted in the Treaty of Londo
in 1871, signed by Great Britain, Austria, France, Germany, Ital
Russia, and the Ottoman Empire, v/hich left the Straits closed
but enlarged the Sultan’s pov/er to open them in peacetime to
friendly powers and allov/ed the Russians a fleet in the Black
Sea.
The Russians, still not satisfied, were again at v/ar with
Turkey by 1877. Hov;ever, they v/ere again blocked in their effor
to open the Straits for their warships by the preliminary treaty
of San Stefano betv;een Turkey and Russia and by the Treaty of
Berlin of 1878 for the settlement of the affairs of the East
signed by the Western Pov;ers. The latter reaffirmed the status
quo ante as determined by the treaties of 1856 and 1871.
Russia ostensibly accepted her diplomatic defeat, but did
not forget. In 1881, she made a secret agreement v;ith Austria-
Hungary and Germany that the three pov/ers would "take care in
common that Turkey (should) make no exception to this rule (clo-
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ment whotsoever by lending to the v/arlike operations of a belli-
gerent power" the Straits, and that if Turkey did so, she v/ould
be informed she was "puttimg herself in a state of v.^r towards
(4)
the injiured party." After 1890, however, German influence
in Turkey ^egan to increase, and there was, therefore, a trend
toward anti-Russian feelings in the German Government,
After her war with Japan, Russia decided she needed an al]||y
to support her claims for opening the Straits, and, therefore,
settled her difficulties with Great Britain, making possible the
Triple Entente of England, Russia, and France of 1907. Russia
did not hesitate to reopen the question of the Straits to her
new ally. Sir Edward Grey finally stated that ’^England must no
longer make it a settled pb^^ct of her policy to maintain the
existing arrangement with regard to the passage of the Darda-
(5)
nelles." Russia was encouraged by this statement; she felt
that it marked "a great evolution in the relations of the tv;o
( 6 )
countries." Great Britain seemed v/illing in principle to dis-
cuss a change, but she made no attempt to obtain the permission
of the other pov;ers.
In 1908, Russia used the tension that existed between Aus-
tria-Hungary and Russia over the Sandjak Railv/ay plan to bring
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agreed to acquiesce in Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Bosnia
and Herzegovina on condition that Austria support Russia in her
efforts the have the Straits opened. Hov/ever, Austria-Hungary
annexed the tv.^o provinces much sooner than Russia had expected
and before she was ready to present her Straits demand to the
other powers. When Russia then hurried to bring up the issue,
she was met by a negative attitude on the part of the British/
Russia’s frustration caused a definite coldness in her relationi^
with Austria-Hungary and has been cited as one of the factors
leading to World V/ar I. Russia’s active Foreign Minister, Izvo
ski, did not give up, however, for he made secret treaties v/ith
both Italy and Bulgaria to guarantee a benevolent attitude on
their part tov^ard his request. The war over Tripoli in Septem-
ber of 1911 appeared to be a good opportunity for presenting
Russian wishes, because she had agreed tv;o years earlier to
acquiesce in Italian claims to Tripoli. However, at that time
Turkey was reluctant to change what she felt vTas a satisfactory
Straits regime; France was traditionally friendly to Turkey
and was not anxious to increase Russia’s pov/er; Germany had
abandoned her sympathetic attitude tov;ard Russia; Great Britai|i
was still unv/illing to take the iniative.
During the Balkan Wars, Great Britain proposed informally
the internationalizatioh and neutralization of Constantinople,
but the suggestion vras unfavorably received by both Russia and
France. At the peace negotiations, although not mentioned spe
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cifically, .undoulDtedly influenced the Russian attitude. She no'
wanted to he certain that Turkey itself was intact, hut also
insisted that the strategic islands near the Dardanelles he kep
imder Turkish sovereignty and consented,finally, to their annexj|-
ation hy Greece only on condition of their being neutralized.
At the beginning of the World War, interest in the Strait^
was still as intense as it had ever been. Rumania had no door
upon any other sea; Serbia and Hungary both had access to the
Black Sea through the Danube River. Even Bulgaria, given the
two mediocre ports of Dedeagatch and Port Lagos on the Aegean
by the Balkans Wars (she did not retain these ports after 1918),
was still iiterested in being able to use the Straits.
The World War made the Black Sea po-'Yers even more anxious
to control their waterv/ay. Throughout most of the v^ar, Turkey
v/as fighting against the Allies, and the Straits were closed
to all v.^rships, including those of the Black Sea powers. How-
ever, in August, 1914, two German warships passed through the
Dardanelles, thus violating the treaties of 1856 and 1871, and
anchored in Constantinople, where they stayed more than twenty-
four hours v/ithout being requested to leave or being interned
as international lav/ demands. When the Allies protested, Turkejlr
purchased these vessels for their ovm fleet in what v/as obvious!,
a fictitious transaction. Rebaptized and recommissioned, they
remained under German control and kept v/atch over the Straits.
In September, 1914, a Turkish warship v/as stopped outside the
(I!
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Dardanelles and forced to turn back; the next day Turkey closed
the Straits completely, thus cutting a vital line of communica-
tion betv/een the Western Allies and Russia. After a skirmish
with the Turkish fleet, Russia declared war on November 4th.
This breaking of communication through the Straits betv;een the
Allies is believed to have prolonged the war for a year or more,
Early in 1915, Russia suggested a campaign against the
Dardanelles from the Aegean side to distract the Turks, but the
British developed the plan to include actual occupation of the
Straits and reestablishment of communications between the Allies .
Suspicious of ultimate British aims, Russia presented England
and France v/ith a memorandum requesting their consent to her
outright annexation of Constantinople, the European coast of ths
Bosphorus, the Sea of Ivlarmora v/ith its islands, and the Darda-
nelles together v/ith the islands of Imbros and Tenedros, sou-
thern Thrace up to the Enos-Midia line and a small strip of the
Asiatic shores along the Ismid peninsula. Great Britain and
France agreed to this request reluctantly and on condition that
Russia in turn vrauld consent to the satisfaction of Britxsh,
French, and Italian claims and the recognition of their spheres
of interest in the Near East.
The campaign v/as a colossal failure; British and French
warships were unable to force the narrow Dardanelles. Six
weeks later Allied landing parties on the shores of Gallipoli
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failure to break Turkish resistance prevented an early end to
the v/ar; not long after this Russia withdrew from the conflict.
The outcome of the secret understanding among the Allies
concerning the Straits v/as complete embarrassment for them.
The new Bolshevik Government of Russia renounced any claims to
the Straits; moreover, it published and denounced the treaties
it had made v/ith the Allies, and declared that Constantinople
and the Straits ought to remain under Turkish sovereignty. This
gesture began a friendship betv;een Turkey and Russia which v/as
much strengthened in the years that followed.
Thus, at the end of the World V/ar, the most interested
Black Sea power was much too busy with her internal affairs to
worry about the Straits, while Turkey, under whose sovereignty
the Straits remained, v;as much weakened by the war. The VJestern
pov/ers had an opportunity to do exactly as they v/ished v/ith the
Straits.
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The first step in the settlement of the Straits problem
after the Yforld V/ar was peace with Turkey, and, on October 30,
1918, the Armistice of Mudros was signed, opening the Straits
by forcing the surrender of all Turkish military and naval forces.
An Allied force of occupation, mde up chiefly of British troops
,
was sent to strategic points controlling the Straits until a de-
finite settlement could be made.
In January, 1918, President "lilson had declared in Point
T^A^lve of his Fourteen Points that "the Dardanelles shoiild be
permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce
U)
of all nations under international guarantees." The first plar
suggested for applying this principle would have given the United
States a mandate over Constantinople and the Straits, but Presi-
dent Wilson refused to accept the mandate. Annexation by any
one of the European Allies was out of the question because of
jealousies among them; Turkey vrould have to maintain nominal
sovereignty.
The result of Allied efforts at practical application of
Wilson* s Twelfth Point was the Treaty of Sevres, August, 1920,
which left Constantinople in Turkish control, subject to modi-
fication of its status by the Allies if Turkey did not live up
to the provisions of the treaty. These provisions were as fol-
lows: (1) The Straits v;ere to be open bothiin peace and war to
merchant vessels, and the aircraftoof all nations; (2) no act of
1. James T, Shotwell and Francis Deak. Turkey at the Straits
.
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hostility (unless under a decision of the League of Nations)
could be committed in the Straits nor could the area be blockad^c
(3) a Commission was to be set up composed of the Allied and
Associated Powers plus Greece and Rumania, and, in addition,
The U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, and Turkey, as soon as they were admitt^c
to the League. The Commission was to have broad pov.-ers and was
to be independent of the local authorities; at any time it coulc
call for the assistance of the Allied troops maintained in the
region in assuring freedom of passage.
Thus ^ facto control of the area by the Turks wonldo be
nullified directly by the creation of the Allied Commission and
also indirectly by the Greek control of the European shores of
the Dardanelles. Demilitarization of the Straits zone v.^as pro-
vided so as to remove Turkish military influence, but since
I
Constantinople had to made safe from hostile attack, and a gen-
eral international guarantee would be too slow and ineffective
in an emergency, joint Allied occupation was provided for.
The Treaty of Sevres was never ratified by Turkey; ir
consideration of the balance of pov/er in the Mediterranean, the
treaty was a satisfactory solution. However, the balance of po-
wer v/as completely altered within the next two years. The Sovidi
Union emerged as a united nation ready to repair whatever damage
had been done to her international prestige, ready to renevf her
efforts to control the Straits. On the other hand, Turkey was
rapidly becoming a modern nation, first, under the leadership
of the Young Turks, and, later, Kemal Ataturk; she was strong
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enough to object effectively to the huniliating Treaty of Sevres
.
In 1919, Greek troops landed in Smyrna with the permissior
of Great Britain and France {granted partly to forestall Italy
in the Near East) . The Greco-Turkish v^ar thus begun caused a
strong nationalist movement in Turkey. When France and Italy
realized that Turkey was not only defeating the Greeks but v/as
strong enough even to challenge the Allies, they made separate
agreements with the nevr Turkish Government. Great Britain alone
clung stubbornly to her support of Greece; she rushed troops to
reinforce the defenses of Cons tintinople and to prevent the Turks
from regaining control over the Straits. Her appeals to France,
Italy, Yugoslavia, Ruxiania, Greece, who had been forced out of
the area by that time, and even to her ovm Dominions in vain.
Conversely, France and Italy became so annoyed as to recall
their troops stationed nearby, leaving Britain to hold off the
Turks alone. Italy felt Greek ambitions might be a threat to
her ovm. designs in Anatolia and v;as suspicious of too much British
interest in the Greeks. On the other hand, France had become
bitter after realizing that a three-pov/er guarantee of the Straits
meant that Britain, as the largest naval powder, would have con-
trol. An Armistice vjas signed on October 11, 1922, by which
Turkey agreed not to move against the neutral zone of Chanak
and the Straits.
During the v;ar, the Soviet Union laid the foundations for
friendship with Turkey. In I^rch, 1921, she signed a Treaty of
Alliance, recognizing the integrity of Turkey as defined by the
VSS
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the Angora National Pact, April, 1920, and voluntarily denoimclig
the Trans-Caucasian territories she had acquired earlier. More-
over, the Soviet Union gave arms and money to help Turkey in thj
war against the Greeks, In addition. Allied intervention in
Russia made the new Soviet government equally hostile to the
Allies, drawing the tv/o countries together naturally. The main
source of contention between them, the question of Armenia, was
solved by a compromise agreement.
Itcvras obvious that the Treaty of Sevres v/as not satis-
factory for the new conditions; on November 20, 1922, a confer-
ence to draw up a final settlement was opened at Lausanne with
representatives from Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greeco,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, the United States, Turkey, Bulgaria, the
Soviet Union, Belgium, and Portugal, The chief antagonists
were Great Britain and the Soviet Union; their historic rales
had been reversed for the Soviet Union v/anted the Straits clo-
sed while Great Britain wanted them open. The Soviet Union had
discovered that the free passage of Allied transports into the
Black Sea allowed unv/elcome interference in her internal affairii.
Moreover, her fleet v/as disorganized and small; it was safer
simply to close the Straits. Great Britain, on the other hand,
saw that it vrould be most convenient if she or her allies could
send ships into the Black Sea in case of trouble; formerly. Greet
Britain, on the other hand, had been opposed to opening them
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ingress, even if the Soviet Union should demand special privi-
leges.
A special Straits Convention was attached to the Lausanne
Treaty under Article 23, based on a draft dravm up by Lord Cur-
zon, the British Foreign Minister, and the Turkish delegate. It
represented a compromise between the tvro antagonists. In time
of peace, thei^v/as to be ’’complete freedom of navigation and
passage by day and by night under any flag and v/ith any kind
of cargo” for ’’merchant vessels, including hospital ships, yacht
( 2.)
and fishing vessels, and non-military aircraft.” If Turkey
was neutral during the v/ar, there was also to be freedom of pas-
sage: ’’the duties and rights of Turkey as a neutral power can-
not authorize her to take any measures liable to interfere with
(3)
s
navigation through the Straits.” If Turkey was a belligerent,
she was to have ’’full power to take such measures as she (might)
consider necessary to prevent enemy vessels from using the Strai
These measures were ’’not to be of such a nature as to prevent
the free passage of neutral vessels” provided they were not as-
sisting the enemy ”by carrying contraband, troops, ur enemy na-
(5)
ts.
tionals,” This principle had been fairly well established in
the previous century.
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Freedom of passage for v/arships v/as a more difficult mat-
ter; the British view was accepted with modifications in order
to mollify the Kussians. In peacetime, warships v/ere to he
permitted freedom of passage v/ithout distinction of flag, but
’’the maximum force which any one pov/er. . (might) , .send through
the Straits into the Black Sea. . (vras) . .not to be greater than
that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral powers of the
Black Sea. existing in that sea at the time of passage; but
with provision that the powers reserve to themselves the right
to send into the Black Sea, at all times and under all cir-
cumstances, a force of not more than three ships, of which no
{'6 )
individual ship shall exceed 10,000 tons."
Vfarships of both neutral and belligerent countries were
to have freedom of passage during a war if Turkey was neutral,
but belligerent warships might not commit hostilities, or exer-
cise the ri,ght of visit, search, and capture in the Straits,
although these limitations did not apply to the detriment of
belligerent rights in the Black Sea. If Turkey was belligerenl|,
neutral vessels only were to have the right of freedom of pas-
sage, and measures taken by Turkey to prevent the passage of
enemy forces were not to prejudice neutral rights.
The Straits Convention also provided for demilitarization
of both the European and Asiatic shores of the Boshhorus and the
Dardanelles. However, Turkey was allowed to maintain a garrisoa
6. Loc. cit
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not exceeding 12,000 men, an' arsenal, and a naval "base in Con-
stantinople, and, in addition, Turkey had the right to trans-
port her armed forces through the demilitarized zones. The is-
lands in the Sea of Ivlarmora and the Greek and Turkish islands
in the Aegean Sea (SamOthrace
,
Lemnos, Imhros, Tenedos, and the
Rabbit Islands) were also demilitarized. Turkey and Greece con4|d
remilitarize these zones provided theynnotif ied the signatories
and restored the status cuo at the end of the war.
The regime of the Straits V7as to be supervised and control-
led by the International Straits Commission, comprised of one r^
presentative of each signatory power (the United States would
also be entitled to a seat upon agreement to the Convention)
.
The Commission \vas under permanent presidency of Turkey and wa^
required to send an annual report to the League of Nations. In
order to offset the "unjustifiable danger" v^hich the demilitari-j
zation of areas concerned might make to the safety of Turkey,
as well as to the freedom of the Straits, the signatory pov/ers
agreed that "should the freedom of navigation of the Straits or
the security of the demilitarized zones be imperiled by a vio-
lation of the provision relating to freedom of passage or by a
surprise attack or some act of \mr or threat of V7ar," they, "aci
ing in conjunction, vrill meet such violation, attack or other
act of war or threat of war, by all means that the Council of
(7)
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T Turkey was feetter satisfied vrlth this treaty than v/ith
the Treaty of Sevres. The security of Constantinople was much
better safeguarded, and her demands for prestige were adequate-
ly satisfied by her presidency pf the Commission in contmst to
the Treaty of Sevres provision that the Commission vras to be
completely independent of the local authorities.
The Soviet Union v/as the ohly pov^er dissatisfied with the
compromise; the Soviet delegate was alone in maintaining that
the Straits should be closed to vrarships both in peace and war,
Turkey, although a close friend of the U.S.S.R.,did not support
her view. She may still have been a little afraid of giving the
Russians too much power and, at the same time, have felt that
she V7as strong enough not to have to seek out Russian favor. The
Soviet delegate, Monsieur Chicherin, signed under protest, and
later, the Soviet Government refused to ratify the treaty.
The lack of Turkish support of Russian v/ishes did not, hov/
ever, destroy Soviet-Turkish friendship. The Soviet Union, fee-
ling herself to be in a weak position, decided there was less
chance of Turkish exploitation of it if the friendship continued
Turkey, on her part, v/anted a friendly Soviet to support her in
any changes in the Straits regime later on. A treaty of neutra-
lity and non-aggression, to be renev/able every ten years, v/as
signed by the two countries in December, 1925, in vrhich each .s
agreed to maintain her neutrality if the other was attacked by
a third power and not to make any political or military alliance
directed against the other signatory.

This regime of the Straits worked satisfactorily for sev-
eral years. The annual reports made no mention of any diffi-
culties of importance; freedom of navigation was proving bene-
ficial to growing international trade. Even the demil itarizati<|fn
clauses did not v/orry Turkey since a general disarmament v/as
expected. Tv;o incidents, however, indicated the Soviet attitud^
clearly to alert observers. In February, 1924, at the Rome Na-
val Conference, Admiral Berens, representing the Soviet Union,
claimed a maximum of 400,000 tons total tonnage for Soviet capi4
tal ships in opposition to the British suggestion of 110,000 tons
unless the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea were closed to the fleei
s
of non-littoral povrers. This indirect complaint about the Stra|ts
regime had no effect other than to contribute to the general
failure of the Naval Conference.
In January, 1930, two Russian warships passed the Straits
supposedly unobserved by the Turkish officials, but obviously
with their connivance. This demonstrated how difficult it would
be to prevent Soviet violation of the convention if the Turco-
Soviet friendship became too close, especially since the Strait^
Commission v/as pronounced powerless in such a case by the Bri-
tish government.
-VQ.': rro'i ^a?fnovr c:? ._U-*ra-<. p>jffJ- to aml^o'r eXrfT
vrr/: 'to noist'rqin orT.9X>r£L Bv+^^'ct^t r.cvnri- srfT .-•v"’*-.
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TURiaSH REQUESTS FOR REVISION OF THE STRilTS CONVENTION
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World conditions ten years after the signing of the Strail
s
Convention v/ere not so rosy as the treaty makers had hoped they
vrould he. There had been a series of treaty repudiations and
undeclared wars. The Disarmament and World Economic Conferences
had failed; rearmament was widespread. Germany, Japan, Italy,
and other states were in the grip of the increasingly dynamic
foreign policies of their authoritarian governments. The League
had proved incapable of coping with major difficulties such as
the Italo-Ethiopian affair and the Manchurian conflict. Even
though sanctions could be passed, collective guarantees were
slow in offering protedtion, slow in functioning, and ineffecti^/B
in any case. Small powers, among them Turkey, no longer felt
secure against aggression.
It is not surprising that Turkey now viewed as obsolete
the Straits Convention of the Lausanne Treaty, v/hich compensated
for the demilitarization clauses with a collective guarantee. In
addition to the inefficiency to be expected in the operation of
any such guarantee, one of the four poxvers in this specific gua-
rantee, Italy, v/as in conflict v;ith the remaining two. Great
Britain and France. The fourth, «^apan, had already v/ithdrav/n
from the League. Moreover, there was no clause in the Straits
Convention which permitted Turkey to take m»asures before war
broke out, and measures taken after'/zards
,
as Ethiopia ’3 case
shov7ed, would be too late,
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hanced her prestige enormously since 1920. She v/as becoming
modern in every v/ay—in customs, in education, in government,
in a military sense. She had signed treaties of friendship with
all the Yfestern powers; she had been admitted to the League in
1932, and, in 1934, she was on the Council of the League. It
v»ras Turkey who had been largelyeinstrumental in forming the Bal-
kan Entente, and, at the same time, she had maintained her frien|^
ship with her Asiatic neighbors and with the Soviet Union. V^ith
her nevj importance as a full-fledged member of the family of na-
tions she resented even more the fact that she did not have ab-
solute sovereignty over the Straits zone, part of her owti ter-
ritory. One author suggested that the prestige motive was the
main',one, that it is "tempting to suppose that Turkey* s complaints
concerning the immediate menace to her security were deliberatel|r
somewhat exaggerated, and that she merely seized a long-awaited
opportunity to take a step which, though based in part on con-
siderations of long-time security, was verv largely inspired by
( 1 )
considerations of national prestige." At any rate, prestige,
coupled with her justified concern over the dangers of a demili-
tarized zone at the Straits, a concern which she could at least
diminish by fortifying the area to the best of her ability, led
Turkey to seek revision of the Straits Convention.
As early as ivlarch, 1933, the Turkish representative men-
tioned the possible revision of the Straits regime to Sir John
L. D.A.Routh, "The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of ^
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Simon unofficial3-y. At the meeting of the General Commission
of the Conference in tiay of the same year, I'.Ionsieur Aras, the
Turkish representative at Geneva, brought up the matter during
a discussion of the British draft proposals for the limitation
of heavy artillery, M. Aras pointed out that the limitations
proposed v;ould increase the insecurity of the Straits in case
of attack by naval forces, and suggested that, rather than make
a special exception in favor of Turkey, the members permit her
to remilitarize the area. He said, too, that this v/ould be mor 5
in line vrith the equalitarian treatment suggested for ex-enemy
povrers in the same British draft, intended to replace certain
military provisions of the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon, an
L
Neuilly. M. Aras also proposed that a committee of the Con-
ference, made up of the representatives of the riverain po'vers
of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, and the representatives
of Japan and the United States consider the matter. This pro-
posal for revision v/as received vrith interest by the British
representative and several other members of the General Com-
mission, but no action v;as taken. The French delegate, M. Paul--
Boncour, however, viev/ed it v/ith suspicion, remarking that pro-
posals for treaty revisions were out of place at a disarmament
conference. The matter was postponed.
Turkey again brought up the question during the bilateral
Greco-Turkish negotiations in Rome, July, 1933, leading to the
Balkan Pact. Turkey suggested a TEuxine Pact” by which permis-
ion for the remilitarization of the Straits zone might be ob-
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tained. However, Bulgaria and Jugoslavia ruined this plan hy
their suspicions of Greece and Turkey, who, they felt, were
aiming at hegemony of the Balkans.
In May. 1934, the Turkish Government decided to inauguratd
a seven year rearmament plan. She felt that the recent close
friendship hetv7een Bulgaria and Jugoslavia offered a threat to
her Thracian border. Moreover, Mussolini's declaration that
"Italy's historic objectives are in Asia and Africa" had alarmec
her, and his statement th^Lt he regarded Turkey as European power
( 2 )
didiinot allay her fears. for Anatolia, M, Aras repeated his re-
quest for revision and questioned the efficacy of the guarantee
clause of the Lausanne Straits Convention, since the League had
been v/eakened by Japan's leaving and Italy's hostility. He and
Sir John Simon had a lively correspondence on the matter with
the result that M. Aras v/ithdrew his request, assuring the Bri-
tish Government that "in the present circumstances the Turkish
(3)
Government" did "not intend to pursue the matter."
However, Turkey was not permanently discouraged, for, in
April, 1935, during a discussion of H. Laval's draft resolution
concerning sanctions, Aras remarked that Turkey considered the
demilitarization clauses to be of a discriminatory nature. He
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conditions as fixed "by existing treaties, Turkey herself vrould
feel she should, in consideration of her ov/n security and the
principle of equality, modify the Straits regime. He v;as, of
course, referring to the military clauses of the Treaties of
St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly then on the agenda for the
Stresa Conference. This was the bluntest mention of the sub,]ec1t
so far and gained the declared support of the Soviet delegate
and the promise from the British that the question v7ould be on
the agenda at the Rome Conference, to be held in the early part
of 1935. However, no such conference ^vas held, and Turkey’s
chance, if the pov;ers really meant to carry out their promise,
V7as gone for the time being.
The matter V7as mentioned briefly at the annual meeting of
the Balkan Entente at Bucarest and again at the plenary meeting
of the League Assembly in Geneva September 14, 1935. Turkey
was becoming more amd more obsessed with the idea of remilitari-
zation'. During the session in November, when the imposing of
sanctions on Italy was being discussed, the deputy Foreign
Minister v/arned that "Turkey will not hesitate to take the ne-
cessary stens" to make the Straits secure "in case of unforseen
(4)
occurrences." There v/ere such widespread rumors of the immineitb
closing of the Straits that no commercial shipping ventured
through them for three days for fear of being stranded. Plowevei]
Turkey did not close them, and her threat proved ineffective in
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March. 1936, Gemany reoccupied the Rhineland, and rumors
were even more prevalent that Turkey was going to follov/ her
example hy seizing the Straits and refortifying them. During
the special meeting of the League Council held in London to
discuss the situation, the Turkish Foreign Minster raised the
problem of the Straits informally with the representatives of
the V/estern powers. It is certain that Turkey was tempted to
confront the v;orld v;ith the accomplished fact as Germany had
done. On the advice of the British Ambassador, Sir Percy Lo-
raine, she decided to request the League for permission to re-
fortify the Straits.
Turkey determined not to take direct action not so much
because of any moral obligation or any genuine respect for in-
ternational treaties, but because peaceful change was more ad-
vantageous to her. Turkey, while much stronger than before,
was still a small power, and small states, especially at that
time, depended on the large nations for protection. She "could
obtain full datisfaction for her claims without undermining
further either the Geneva system, to which she was now deeply
committed, or the system of international lav;"’*she depended
on, and, "in additioh, she would earn for herself all the moral
prestige of being, in contrast v;ith Germany, Austria, and Italy
(5)
the ’good boy of Europe.’"
On April 10, 1936, M, Aras announced at a meeting of the
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a formal request for revision' of the Straits Convention in regard
to the remilitarization problem had been decided upon. Identic§.L
notes were sent to the representatives of the signatory powers
in Angora, to Jugoslavia (who had not signed because of difficul-
ties vdth Turkey over the Ottoman public debt)
,
and to the Sec-
retary-General of the League.
The note explained in detail vrhy Turkey felt that a change
was necessary and emphasized the good faith in v/hich the request
vras made to ensure "the security of Turkey and the inviolability
of Turkish territory" as v/ell as "the development in a helpful
spirit of commercial navigation between the Mediterranean and
( 6 )
the Black Sea." It also reminded the powers of her record of
loyalty to her international agreements. Turkey requested an
early discussion for revision and suggested May 11 as a suitable
date. She again v/arned the signatory powers that if her request
was not granted, she might "be led to take upon herself the re-W
sponsibility" of carrying out the necessary measures. She men-
tioned recent fortification of the Dodecanese Islands as a direc;
Italian threat to her ovn security at its most vulnerable point.
The reaction to the Turkish note vreis immediate and gener-
ally favorable. The Soviet Government v^s the most enthusiastic
,
writing, April 16, 1936, that the principle of full Turkish sov-
ereignty had been afirmed in the Soviet-Turkish treaties and had
been supported at the time of the Lausanne Treaty, and the Sovie'.
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Government had seen no reason to change its attitude.
Great Britain, too, sent a note April 16 saying that she
was v/illing to deal with the matter vrithout delay. This ready
agreement meant, of course, a change in the British attitude;
one reason v:as the non-applicability of the former objection
that such a move would encourage similar German action concern-
ing the Rhineland. More important vras the British ^rish to find
a new ally in the Mediterranean since the Italian upsetting of
the earlier balance of power. Britain hoped that Turkey might
still be kept from too close a friendship with the Soviet Union
The French Government also sent its immediate approval of
the Turkish note. Although she v^as opposed, in general, to tre|kty
revision, she was anxious to see an increase in the influence
of her ally, the U.S.S.R.
The Balkan states v:ere not so enthusiastic in their an*-
swers; they were inclined to be suspicious and jealous of Tur-
key’s acquiring too much power. Greece looked for^,vard to the
remilitarization of the Straits area because, since the Greco-
Turkish Pact, Turkey and she had been friendly and also because
it would justify Greek plans to refortify the islands of Lemnos
( 8 )
and Samothrace, Jugoslavia also approved the proposal on the
grounds that any reinforcement of the security of a member of
the] Bhlkan Entente vrould be of advantage to the others. Neither
8. The Greek islands of Chios, Samos, Mytilene and Icaria \?ere
demilitarized under a different heading in the Treaty of



























































Bulgaria nor Rumania liked the idea of a Soviet-Turkish lake.
Hov/ever, Bulgaria felt that, if this revision succeeded, it
V70uld give her an opportunity to press the proposed revision of
the arms clause of the Treaty of Neuilly and the article concer-4
ning her right to an outlet on the Aegean Sea. Rumania, who haq
more to lose than any other European state because she had no
outlet on the Aegean Sea, felt that she must approve of the
Turkish suggestion or lose an ally.
The Turkish Government, tealizing that the Balkan states
might be reluctant to approve her suggestion, sent the Secretary
of the Foreign Office on a tour of the Balkan capitals duning
the last part of April. The Balkan states, probably convinced
by threats of Italian preponderance in the Mediterranean, sent
their answers by the end of April, Bulgaria on the ?4th, Greece
on the S2nd, Jugoslavia on the 28th, and Rumania on the 29th.
They reaffirmed their positions at the meeting of the Permanent
Council of the Balkan Entente on May 4th, and all agreed to sup-
port Turkey on condition that Turkey alv/ays advise them before
closing the Straits in time of ^'/ar, and that then they should
meet to decide on the common measures to be taken innsuch a case
Japan acknowledged the note and notified Tvirkey of her
acceptance in principle of the request; Italy did not condescend
to answer the note. The only indication she gave of her opinion
on the matter appeared in the official press, that the Straits
question v’as one affecting thr situation in the Mediterranean as
a v/hole and not merely the security of Turkey. Such an attitude
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on Italy’s part was embarrassing to the Tur-kish C-dvernment and
the other Lausanne signatories, because Italy, for several yearfe
had had the largest tonnage passing through the Straits annually
Italy was probably suspicious of British and French motives for
accepting the Turkish request, and, perhaps, even felt that she
could bargain with the other povrers concerning Ethiopia or the
Mediterranean naval arrangements betv/een Great Britain, France,
Turkey, Greece, and Jugoslavia, which had been annoying her.
The Italian press did hint that perhaps Italy would cooperate
on the Straits issue after the raising of sanctions at the Lea-
gue Council Meeting in June.
Germany’s reaction, as an interested but uninvited ptate,
was favorable. Her ovvi interests were, as a naval pov^er, in
her increasingly frequent use of the Danube River. Turkey’s
move constituted, Germany said, a continuation of her ovm policj'
of rejecting certain ideas of security. However, she V7as annoyed
with Soviet support of the Turkish desire V7hen the Soviet Goveriji
ment would not do the same for her under similar circumstances.
Another interested state, Hungary, approved wholeheartedly
because it was to set a useful precedent for treaty revision.
Although the necessary approval had been won by the end
of April, the signatory nations shovred no great haste in setting;
a date. A rumor that the Turkish Government had already begun
refortification of the Straits reminded them that Turkey was
not to be satisfied with mere promises. The date v/as finally
set as June 2Snd, four days before the League Coujicil Meeting
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at Geneva; it v/as hoped that by the time the Conference resumed
its plenary meetings at the beginning of July after the Geneva
meetings that an Italian representative would be sitting with
them.
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1 CHAPTER IV
THE MONTREHX CONEERENCE OF 1936

43
The Montreux Conference opened on June S2, 1936 in the
Salle des Fetes of the Montreux Palace Hotel with M. Motta,
serving as president, welcoming the delegates on the behalf of
the Svniss Government. The chief delegates were Mr. Bruce, re-
presenting Australia, Dr. Nicolaev, representing Bulgaria, M.
Paul-Boncour
,
France, Lord Stanhope, Great Britain, M. Politis,
Greece, Ivir. Sato, Japan, M. Titulescu, Rumania, M. Litvinov,
the U.S.S.R., M. Rustu Aras
,
Turkey, and M. Suhotic, represent-
ing Jugoslavia. The Dominions of India, South Africa, Nev; Zea-
land, Irish Free State, and Canada sent letters stating that,
although they would not send delegates, they would he v/illing
to accept the decisions of the conference. Mr. Bruce of Aus-
tralia was elected president as being the most impartial re-
presentative present because his country’s interest in the Strai|bs
was obviously indirect. M. Aghnides, of the League Secretariat,
was elected Secretary-General.
The Conference itself was divided into tvro main periods.
During the first, a Turkish draft, prepared by the Turkish Gov-
ernment earlier in June, was adopted as the basis for discussioi^,
The first reading was completed by June 26the, and the plenary
meetings v;ere adjourned to permit the chief delegated to parti-
cipate in the Geneva Council and Assembly meetings. The draftinj^
and technical committees, however, remained in session during
this adjournment. On July 6, plenary sessions were resumed,
with a British draft dravm up during the interim as the basis
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for discussion. On July 18, a compronise was finally reached,
and, on July 20, the Montreux Convention was officially signed.
The Turkish draft provided for changes nore drastic than
had been anticipated by the signatory povrers. The preliminary
negotiations had been concerned only with the demilitarization
clauses of the Lausanne Straits Convention. In Ivfeiy, the British
Government had received assurances through M.Aras that only
these clauses and those immediately related v/ere to be dealt
with and then only on the basis of strict reciprocity between
Black Sea and non-Black Sea powers. It is believed, therefore,
that the Soviet Union, obviously stronger than she had been at
the time of the Lausanne Conference, had brought pressure to
bear on the Turkish Government between l.iay and the beginning
of the Montreux Conference. The Turkish draft was, probably,
the result of Turco-Soviet collaboration.
The preamble, to "regulate the passage and navigation
of the Straits in such a way as to safeguard international
commerce within the framework of the security of Turkey," made
no mention whatever of the principle of freedom of the Straits
,
( 1 )
as had the Lausanne Treaty. Articles 3-9, providing for the
demilitarization of the Straits area v^s left out entirely,
along with Articles 10-16, dealing v/ith the composition and
functions of the International Commission. Turkey v/as satisfied
with the general principles for passage of commercial ships in
peacetime, making no important changes there,
1
.
p.A .rcouth."The Montreux ConventionRegarding the Regime of thel
Black Stja Straits," Survey of International Affairs. London.
1937, p.614
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Two changes were suggested concerning rights of merchant
ships during war. The Turkish draft included a paragraph in
Article 3 reiterating what the Lausanne Convention had mentione(j.
only incidentally that these rights should he conditioned hy
Turkey’s obligations under the Covenanttof the League. This
addition was an indication that Turkey v/anted to be sure she
could legally stop or hold the aggressor’s merchant ships. AlsA
when Turkey was belligerent, merchant ships were not to pass by
day or by night, but only by day and along a route approved by
the Turkish authorities.
In the section dealing with warships, the Turkish draft
also contained changes; in Article 6, v;as the statement that,
in time of peace, v/arships vrere to pass by day only and then
just for the purpose of paying courtesy visits. Moreover, they
must give one month’s notice before doing so. The maximum forc^
was to be limited to 14,000 tons although riverain povrers might
send up to 25,000 tons through the Straits, v;ith the special
permission of the Turkish Government, on condition of going
through the Straits singly. None of these restrictions had ap-
peared in the Lausanne Convention. Also, total tonnage of all
non-riverain pov/ers was not to exceed 28,000 tons, and no non-
riverain warship might remain more than fifteen days. In v/ar-
time, if Turkey was neutral, the same regulations were to be in
force with the additional provision that no v/arship v/as permitted
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other hand, Turkey helligerent
,
no v;arship could pass the
Straits without obtaining the special permission of the Turkish
Government; in contrast, the Lausanne Convention allov;ed neutra]
warships to pass the Straits on their own responsibility. By
this provision, the Turkish Government gained practically com-
plete control over the Straits during a war in which she was
belligerent. By the Turkish draft, submarines were not to be
permitted to pass, and both civil and military aircraft ims re-
quired to fly along a route indicated by the Turkish authorities
Article 9 of the Turkish draft provided that if Turkey
felt herself faced v/ith a general of special threat of war, she
would have the right to apply the provisions of Article 8, pro-
vided she informed the signatories and the Secretary-General of
the League. This vro.s an innovation, for the Lausanne Convention
had contained no provision for action before v/ar actually began,
and, as mentioned earlier, this v/as one of the Turkish objec-
tions to the Lausanne Straits Convention.
In this draft ocnvent ion, Turkey had increased her security
and her strategic strength. The threat to Constantinople had
been lessened not only by the refortification allov:ed but by
the limitation on the size of ships permitted to pass through
the Straits. The latter v^as planned so that there would never
be a naval force in the Straits whose total tonnage exceeded one
half of the effective Turkish. The draft was also favorable to
the Soviet Union since it put further limits on the non-riverain
powers with only one limitation affecting the Soviet Union, that
-TT tr . »
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limiting the size and form of ships which might pass through at
any one time. There was to be no limit whatsoever on the the
total tonnage the Soviet Union might send into the I.iediterran-
ean; in other words, the Soviet Union had almost gained the
complete freedom of egress she had always \mnted.
In apite of her violent objections, there was nothing for
Great Britain to do but accept the Turkish draft as the basis
for discussion. However, this put the British delegation on th^i
defensive, and almost led to the failure of the convention, Frc
-
bably Turkish reminders that she intended to protect the Strait^
eventually anyivay was the force V7hich prevented breakdovm of
the conference. According to the British Government, the Tur-
kish draft vjas far too favorable to the Soviet Union; she felt
that the Black Sea’s becoming a Soviet lake with practically
unlimited egress for the Russian fleet, in upsetting the balanc^
of pov/er in the Mediterranean, might precipitate a general race
in armaments. Britain had a lurking mistrust of Soviet inten-
tions, and favored returning to the nineteenth century policy
of close collaboration v;ith Turkey, England had no desire to
join the Franco-Soviet bloc, but at the same time, she did not
vjish to see Europe divided into tv/o opposing groups. She was
also anxious to see that tother povrers, such as Germany, vjere
pleased by the Convention,
The general Soviet attitude, of course, was that the
Straits be wide open to her ovm v;arships but as near shut as
possible to warships of non-riverain pov/ers. The Soviet delegatlle
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made this feeling clear on the second day of the Conference:
"we all know that these Straits .. .have a special c'rj.rr.otc:
character and that they are not comparahle with
certain international canals and other Straits,
in this, that they do not lead anywhere else than
into the Black Sea, which is a closed sea; they
cannot he utilized for transit to a destination
of other countries. It is in taking into consid-
eration these circumstances that numerous Europe-
an statesmen, including, for example, Lord Pal-
merston, the Duke of ^"ellington, pronounced them-
selves on numerous occasions in favor of the clo-
sure of the Straits. Closure of these Straits is
of very great importance for the security, not on-
ly of Turkey, hut of all the States of the Black
Sea. Doubtless the best way to guarantee the se-
curity v7ould be to close completely the Straits
to v’arships of non-riverain States. Nevertheless,
my Government does not insist on this closure and
is ready to support the Turkish proposition tend-
in^ to keep the Straits open for certain ends and
under certain limitations to the ships of all na-
tions, with full freedom of passage by the Straits
for commercial vessels." (2)
Another statement made by M. Litvinov on June 24th v;ill make
this fundamental attitude even clearer:
"I V7ish to emphasize that we cannot neglect the fact
theie exists no other sea which is in the same geogra-
phical situation as the Black Sea, If the Mediter-
ranean Sea or the Baltic Sea were in the same geogra-
phical situation..., I should not oppose equality
of rights between the Bis. ck Sea States and those of
the rest of the world; but... the Mediterranean is




to the contrary, you wish to
penetrate the Black Sea, it is for a definite end.
This may be either to pay a visit of to offer your
assistance to a state in difficulty, in application
of a decision of the League of Nations. For my part,
I cannot imagine another legitimate aim for which
foreign vessels would entdr the Black Sea." (3)














tlr*!j e '. ‘dl da.
- STn , ,.' X .k , 1^ ,k
rrtd r.'of' ISjh ow”
L»^L ’lOJO/:''' ' r!o
,







-'T. :’o" i/L-'O:.’.'; n;fvi io'jl son-- 'TO-nT ojr r yrroiy lo
0 • ’ ‘.:o ody XJ«^ o 'io yj.
- o 3 dn.o'T 'Lf \ oJ ''3'' d, -Oxydrcri .oaci
-^di.
'
" n'-Tt 'r.LO.i'G'JC '5<‘:oo C T




-iJ'Cid 1 ftio TOV ’ ' -/ro.l "lo od"
L: '-r jf' Ox • r * ;:' •.' • t Till ’i'*" . * T-'‘f'GTtovo v:?i
f[o'^.j/3c ' ''T'' f.'Tt.c/T erfT &yo''^(rfry
t '-
1
dOi" oi- - -r*.
.
:'l if’ - ' - 11'
X 'i'r V3^r lo •3 oi » *^0
.'TO : i .
» ^ : /' 07 txadtA*:' T'''''- r l id"




• -• ,i-idfi ' w.
:. •:^co''- •r^ X
X.
•J jLi:.; lootU.y'.y ;0
-Xf - O'i03 ,
;
"'X' ^ ro -.cxi • ^ .j . ’ 1 ,rx
— ; /
:' '
,* Xeoruror O'lC t ‘:*'J r. LfX'-i
'*
T-O 3 di-'.
-"--To 3 '^7 ro txov 7 1*, x^.xro ir.'rro anOT
A V 1 .. » *. c_> 'T’. V 'i: C5 ex'.r8-'i.' v: .. •lit .3
^
-<ru3 .iT/'dT '-• •I'*''? r.oqo o.lTAttd- e.Td
-
;• f I :: J'-' y'yii sri-t •'>
,
‘
vj oo r;n^ dJii:'!:! fiT.'j-Toc 'r-^xin
vf vi-T f-C^r' ,f L *. .






o ’ I • /-• >
1 .
F id I





' el -., -tr -.f'.s.tiM’i-p. is.rf:i--.,.,
-•-‘j
;, .,
. ) > •''fr.t cdd 3 I.'diia." A 3/tc/T ai
)•" d -1 ON ^aadcrj :> od ' .
'





'• ,'{.* od -'o .•X-T -d -, • ' ; '.'ALrd la !'
.r.FS :
’ red oid. r • ' : ‘ .. ST /' o/iri':
'''•
'0 ; ' ton XJ'ron'r, . • • • , .\. . . *.. di L.’ i i
J
•
• O a ; / •„' -orX' . C C'
' /'" T o
‘ ' - • 1C






a ' .<: sifri:a ::o
oT .d-’.t'''' lir'’ . • J .'_ • ... *. d / -.3 cvv









i. d'1 JJ - :»r*3
,
iLfC ' " »''TlO C'"- 1o dia'v a f\f-; - O r", -r r- aM‘i






d- . IC''' .0 a 3 i ! r oo ' > ..
f





•‘.'li:’; ' i d "in "0 i




1A.ioC.oe/: '! c.iX;- a. • a? d''’"':
, f. . .
i> i V jr
49
the other hand, that the Straits he open to Russian v/arships; a
sudden threat of war might make it necessary to transfer the
Black Sea fleet to the Baltic of the Pacific. Moreover, the
Soviet Union needed a safe docl-cyard for naval construction, one
that v/as not ice-ho-ujid,as in the Baltic, or open to attack, as
would one in Vladivostok; hov/ever, if such a dockyard in the
Black Sea was to he of any use, the Soviet Union had to have the
right to transfer this fleet to other seas through the Straits.
Another factor in her attitude v.^s her newly vron membership in
the League and her alliance with France; she wanted to be eer-
tain that the new convention should not hinder the working of
either the League Covenant or the Franco-Soviet Pact.
France was in agreement with the Soviet Union flor similar
reasons, and, in addition, wanted to protect her treaty vrith Ru-
mania, an indispensable factor in the French Alliance system
east of the Alps, from interference of any kind. The Rumanian,
Jugoslav, Greek, and Bulgarian delegates were all also in favor
of the Soviet point of viev; and the Franco-Soviet bloc.
Japan was the only power present to uphold the British
view that the Turkish draft was too favorable to the Soviet Un-
ion. Probably Japan v^as thinlcing of her advantage in 1905 when
the Straits v/ere closed; it would be preferable to prevent the
Soviet Union from transferring her fleet from. one sea to the
other.
Turkey v/atched this dispute between the Soviet Union and
Great Britain impatiently; she shovred her great anxiety by in-
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setting a clause in her draft that the convention should come in
to force from the date of its signature, a most unusual provision.
On Jujie 27, M. Litvinov and M. Paul-Boncour had an infor-
mal discussion v/ith ilr. Eden in v:hich a compromise was reached
in principle; However, during the period when the delegates
were at Geneva, a British draft was drav.Ti up, bringing forward
points Britain ha.d hitherto been unable to bring out. These
lew issues m^de the conflict between the Soviet Union and Great
Britain even more acute than before the Eden-Litvinov conver-
sations .
The British draft, called a "new version" of the Turkish
draft, v/as circulated on July 4|'it reaffirmed the principle of
freedom of passage left out in the Turkish draft, and added
(4)
that it -should "remain in vigor without limit of time." In
Section 1, Turkey was to make no charges for the sanita-ry inspec
tion of ships not calling at Turkish ports. Turkey had vrished
to change these dues. According to the Section concerning war-
ships, ships designed for the transport of inflammable liquids
was excluded from the definitions of auxiliary warships.
Most of the innovations of the British draft dealt with
the passage of v/arships through the Straits. It shortened the
notice required for visits from non-riverain v/arships from one
month to fifteen days. The maximum tonnage vjas limited to one-
half the tonnage of the Turkish fleet or to 15,000 tons, if the
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to send out single ships up to 25,000 tons with Turkish per-
mission v/as completely omitted. Moreover, limitations on non-
riverain warships should not prevent the visit of a fleet of
any size to a Turkish port on the invitation of the Turkish Gov
ernment, provided it left the Straits by the v;ay it entered.
The British added, too, the escalator clause, providing
that the tonnage of non-riverain powers vxas not to exceed
30,000 (28,000 was the figure in the Turkish draft) tons unless
the tonnage of the largest riverain fleet in the Black Sea
should come to exceed that of the largest fleet in that sea at
the time of the signing of the Convention by more than 10,000
tons. After this point, the total allowed to any non-riverain
power was to be increased by a quantity equal to the excess up
to 45,000 tons. Any one non-riverain power v;as to be limited
to three-quarters of the total permitted all non-riverain po-
wers together. In addition, any pov;er, having no force or one
of less than lOpOO tons in the Black Sea, would have the right
to send a naval force for "humanitarian purposes" up to' 10,000
tons, subject, of course, to the special permission of the Tur-
(5)
kish Government. If a naval force is sent for a humani taris.n
purpose, it might remain without time limit, if not, the time
limit was one month.
In Wartime, with Turkey neutral, the regualtions vere to
be the same as in peacetime. As in the Lausanne Convention, tho
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cable to a belligerent power to the detriment of its belligerent
rights. In case of war, in v/hich Turkey v/as belligerent, deci-
sions vjere to be entirely in the hands of the Turkish Govern-
ment. In reference to Turkey *s provision in case of a threat
of v/ar, the British draft coincided, but also stated that Tur-
key must not only notify the signatories of the Convention and
the heague Council, but must agree to cancel any measures it
v/as planning to take, if the League Council decided they v;ere
not justified by a two-thirds majority. British restrictions
on civil aircraft were not so strict as the Turkish. Moreover,
it provided that the International Commission of the Straits
should continue its functiois of collecting statistics and pro-
viding information necessary for applying the limiting clauses.
In conclusion, the British v/ished the new Convention to remain
in force for fifty years.
The British draft, then, was nearly as favorable to Tur-
key as the Turkish draft with the exception of more power's beilig
given to the League and the retaining of the International Com-
mission for some purposes. The draft v;as aimed chiefly at
limiting Soviet gains and trying to make the passage limitation^
more reciprocal. In stating that regulations v/ere not to be to
thedetriment of belli'^erent rights, the draft ejscluded the pos-
sibility of the Soviet’s fleet emerging into the Mediterranean
to attack a hostile fleet and then retiring unpursued into the
Black Sea. With its provisions concerning the tonnage permitte(.
each non-riverain power and the escalator clause, the draft
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made certain that a large naval force could be collected in the
Black Sea on case of a coalition by the non-riverain pov/ers.
The British draft v^as the basis for discussion in the Iasi
part of the Montreux Conference, and, since a brief description
of the main differenced betvreen the Turkish draft and the Bri-
tish draft has been given, it v/as thought best to study the v;ay
in V7hich the compromises were reached on the basis of the final
Montreux Convention.
The first six articles of the British draft were accepted
by the conference. Article l"recognized and affirmed the prin-
ciple of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits
.
Articles 2 through 6 deal with merchant ships; no important
change was made from the Lausanne Straits Convention. In peace-
time and in time of vra.T with Turkey neutral, there v/as to be
complete freedom of passage, while, in time of war when Turkey
was belligerent, merchant ships belonging to a power at war
v/ith Turkey would have freedom of passage provided they entered
by day and follo’ved a route indicated by the Turkish authorities
and did not, in any v/ay, assist the enemy.
Section II v/as concerned v/ith v.^rships; many controversial
issues v/ere brought up in the discussion of this section. Ar-
ticle 9 provided that "naval auxiliary vessels specifically de-
I
signed for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid" would noli
as do v/arships, be required to notify the Turkish Government in
advance of their passage or be counted in the calculation for
6-.--Iamies T. Shotwellaand Francis Deak. Turkey at the Straits
Now York, 1040, p«104 ~
tt
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total tonnage, but v/ould be subjected to all other rules laid
(7)
dov/n for v.^rships. The French Government had tried to have
such fuel-ships taken off the list of vessels of v/ar completely
so that she could import oil from Soviet and Rumanian oil-fields
in sufficient quantities even in v/artime.
Articles 10,11,12, and 13 embodied concessions to the Rus-
sian desires; Article 10 provides that in peacetime, light sur-
face vessels, minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels, v^hether
belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea povrers
,
and v/hatever
their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits.,
( 8 )
provided that such transit is begun during daylight." Article
11 states that "Black 8ea powers may send through the Straits
capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid dov/n in the
first paragraph of Article 14, on condition that these vessels
pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two
destroyers," Put together these two articles mean that vrhile
the non-riverain powers are restricted from sending other than
"light vessels" through the Straits v/ithout adhering to limi-
tation r\iles, the Soviet Union can send through any number of
ships of any size, with the permission of the Turkish Govermaent,
The term "light surface vessel" v/as designed to exclude all types
Df heavily armed vessels, including the German "pocket battleshi]
vhich the 10,000 ton limit of the British draft would not have
severed.
T?
7 . Ibid ,
,
p.l57 8, Loc . cit. 9, Ibid. ,p. 158
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Article 12 V7as also a concession to the Soviet delegation
in that "Black Sea powers ..(were),. to have the right to send
through the Straits. . .submarines constructed or purchased out-
do) .
side the Black Sea.” France had wanted treatment of submar-
ines on the same basis as v/arships, but both Britain and the
Soviet Union opposed this suggestion. The Soviet Union main-
tained that the only exception to total exclusion should be mad
in favor of the Black Sea powers becasue of the absence of fa-
cilities for the construction of submarines in Black Sea dock-
yards.
Articles 13 concerned the number of days^ notice required
by the Turkish Government from v/arships passing through the
I
Straits. As noted before, the Turkish draft had asked for a
notification of one month while the British draft suggested
fifteen days. The Soviet delegate suggested a fifteenn day
notification period for non-riverain powers and a three-day
notification for Black Sea powers.
The question of maximum tonnage to be allov/ed passage
through the Straits was one of the problems causing much dis-
cussion. The Turkish draft provided for a mazimum of 14,000
tons, that is, one-half of the Turkish fleet, while the British
wanted a 16,000 ton limit so that tv;o light cruisers vjith six-
inch guns might be allowed to pass through, "'hen 15,000 was
was decided on as the compromise, llr. Litvinov su^^gested an a-
mendment: ”If we limit passage to 15,000 tons, it will be im-
10. Loc, cit.
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possible for us to send greater units through the ^traits from
one port to another, and I shall he obliged to make an exception
in this regard. One cannot divide units; one must even send t
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them at a single time and, even, in case of need, with an es-
( 11 )
cort.” The Turkish delegate brought forth an amendmenttsat-
isfying Soviet desires, for special privileges for Black Sea
powers, and caused Lord Stanley of the British delegation to
say "if this clause is to give reciprocity and if the non-ri-
verain povrers of the Black Sea are to liave the same advantage,
we are prepared to accept the amendment immediately because it
represents a step tov/ard complete freedom of the seas; but if
this advantage is only to be accorded to the riverain powers
of the Black Sea, that V70uld go entirely against the principle
( 12 )
of reciprocity which v/e have alv/ays had in viev;.” However,
in spite of British objections, Article 11, already noted, gavep
the Soviet Union the special consideration she wanted.
Article 15 states that no vessel of v;ar in transit shall
make use of any aircraft, and Article 16, that no warship shall
remain longer v/ithin the Straits than is necessary. Article 17
provided for the courtesy visits suggested in the British draft
,
Article 18 settled the aggregate tonnage which non-ri-
verain powers may have in the Black Sea in peacetime. This v/as
one of the most controversial issues of the conference and vras
not finally agreed upon until shortly before the close of the
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the maximum tonnage should he 28,000 v:hile the British raised
this to 50,000 and added the "escalator" clause permitting up
to 45,000 tons if at a given moment the tonnage in the Black
Sea of the strongest fleet of a riverain pov;er exceeds hy more
than 10^ the tonnage of the largest fleet in the Black Sea at
the time of the signature of the Convention. M.Litvinov pro-
posed that "the increase (in tonnage from 30,000 tons for non-
riverain pov;ers) begin only after the Black Sea fleet shall
(13)
have been increased by 30% in place of 10%. " Also, he felt
that the tonnage of any one state should be limited to one-half
the global tonnage and that the stay of non-riverain warships
might not be more than f ifteen*;days rather than the month men-
tioned by the British delegation. The British delegation did
not see hov; it could accept the Soviet proposition, for "an in-
crease of 10% would be equivalent to a cruiser, and it seems to
us that if a cruiser is added to the fleet of the Black Sea, it
is only just to admit that the ships of non-riverain powers of
(14)
the Black Sea should have an equivalent increase." The Briti$Ih
did not approve of the Soviet suggestion that the largest non-
riverain fleets be no more than one-half the total, but v/ould
compromise between its suggestion of three-quarters and the
Soviet one of two-thirds. This compromise was accepted along
with a stay limit of twenty-one days for non-riverain v/arships.
The "escalator" clause was incorporated into the Convention
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J The provision in the British draft for a force of 15,000
tons to enter for '’humanitarian purposes” also caused much dis-
cussion. M. Litvinov doubted the utility and the purpose of
humanitarian visits in the Black Sea, since there had not been
such a visit since 1983, and, he felt that if the British figuri*
of 15,000 tons v^ere accepted ”vje might find ourselves in the
(15)
Black Sea in the presence of naval forces superior to our ovm.”
A Soviet delegate offered the follov/ing amendment: "Kevertheless
;
,
if In exceptional cases such an earthquake or other calamity
caused by the elements of nature, one of the non-riverain po-;erji
desires to send into this sea, for humanitarian purposes, one
of its light surface ymirships and if, at the same time, the
global tonnage... is entirely utilized by other non-riverain po-
•v^ers, the entrance of the said ship may take place with the con-
I
sent of all the riverain states of the Black Sea, on the condi-
tion that any later entrance of naval forces of non-riverain
nowers will be effected only v/ithin the limit of the global
(16)
tonnage.” The Bulgarian delegate finally suggested the com-
promise v/hich finally became part of Article 18. Article 18
allov/s no more than 8,000 tons to enter and then only if either
the global tonnage limit has not been reached or, if it has or
will be by the additional 8,000 tons, when the Black Sea Po^'.^ers
have been informed and made no objection.
The question concerning passage of warships through the
15. Ibid
. , P.444 16 . Loc. cit
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Straits in time of war, v/hen Turkey v/as neutral , caused more dif-
ficulty than anything other issue during the conference and
neraly resulted in the hreakdoym of the conference. The first
Soviet objection was to the use of the Word ’’neutral”; it was
felt that since the Kellogg-Briand Pact the category ’’neutral”,
in the sense of favoring neither one side or the other during
a war, no longer existed. The term”non-belligerent” y/as thoiight
to be more appropriate, as expressing a state of non-war but
not implying duties of a ’’neutral.” In the British draft was
the provision that the limitations on the passage of warships
were not to interfere with belligerent rights, as mentioned
before. Naturally, the Soviet Union vehemently disapproved of
this provision, for it v/ould take avjay her immunity from large
scale attacks after she had retreated back into the Black Sea.
She claimed that it was directly contrary to the preferential
treatment the Black Sea pov/ers deserved; secondly, it v/as in
conflict with the principles of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, v/hich
made an end to ’’belligerent rights”. On June 29, the Soviet
delegation offered an amendment: ”In time of y/ar, none of the
riverain states of the Black Sea being belligerent, ^'^arships
and naval auxiliaries will enjou free passage in the Straits”
as provided for earlier, and ”v7hen a riverain state of the Black
Sea other than Turkey is belligerent, passage through the Strait
toward the Black Sea will be forbidden to all warships of non-
„{17)
riverain pov/ers.”
w: ibid.. D. 440
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The British delegation suggested a new amendment on July
8, that if Turkey felt herself menaced hy the passage of a bel-
ligerent fleet, she might close the Straits to all pov/ers v/ith-
60
out discrimination and, if no Black Sea pov/er was belligerent,
she could close the Straits to all belligerent vessels. M.
Litvinov thought that this amendment gave Turkey too much re-
sponsibility and suggested a further amendment that "in a war
in which Turkey is neutral, the Straits shall be closed to all
(18)
belligerent powers" except in cases envisaged in Article 23.
Furthermore, this "shall not... limit in any way the eventual
putting into effect cf the measures envisaged by the Covenant
in regard to an aggressor state, nor.
.
.obstruct the passage
through the Straits of v/arships in execution of engagements of
assistance assumed or to be assumed in the future by states sig-
natory of the present convention by reason of the terms of ag-
reementd supplementary to the Covenant as well as the passage of
(19)
the warships of the state to whom that assistance is due."
The latter v;as, of course, a reference to the Franco-Soviet
Pact. Litvinov said the British draft provision represented an
attitude of friendliness tov/ard the Soviet Union and a lukewarm
attitude tov/ard the League itself.
Regonal pacts such as the Franco-Soviet pact, retorted
the British delegate
,
v/ere framed in such a way as to act in ad-
vance of the Covenant. Thiis, if the League failed to reach un-
animity in naming the aggressor, Turkey might be placed in the
18. Routh, 22. cit .
.
p.632 19. Log. cit.
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position of having to discriminate between tv/o sets of belli-
gerents in virtue of some pact to which she \7as not a party,
or of having to close the Straits against a power whose desig-
nation as an aggressor she had refused to accept. 'J-'he reaction
of the other delegates to this viev; v/as unfavorable. Bothe
France and the Balkan states were suspicious of British intent-
ions. M. Titulescu of Rumania accused Great Britain of pursuing
one policy at Geneva and another at Montreux. if'hey felt that
Great Britain v:anted to oppose the Soviet’s League policy with
an anti-League policy of her ovm.
On July 8 and 9, private conversations betvreen M. Paul-
Boncour, Lord Stanley and M. Litvinov brought no compromise.
Mr, Rendel of the British delegation vrent back to England for
instructions but returned with no change in the official Bri-
tish attitude. Britain still objected to the idea of Turkey’s
being a "non-belligerent ally" of France and the Soviet Union
and asked v/hy, if Turkey really -vra.nted to be on such intimate
terms with the tv;o states, she didnot join the Franco-Soviet
( 20 )
Pact outright. Finally, the British delegation agreed to ab-
andon their claims that v/arships be able to pass the Straits in
pursuit of their "belligerent rights" on condition that the
Branch and Soviet delegations agree not to continue their attemp
to subordinate the Convention to the Franco-Soviet system of
alliance.
On July 15, a compromise vras reached; "vessels of war
‘'0. Ibid
. ,p. 635
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belonging to belligerent pov/ers shall not, hov/ever, pass through
the Straits except on cases arising out of the application of
Article 25 of the present convention, and inccases of assistance
rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty
of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded v/ithin the frame-
( 21 )
v.rork of the Convenant of the League of Nations."
The settlement was looked on as a rather sudden retreat on
the part of Great Britain. There was much speculation as to its
real cause. A French newspaper maintained that it had to do
with the signing of a German-Italian agreement of July 11. Bri-
tain ^ms said to have made ocncessions to the Soviet Union so
that this counter-move would alarm Germany and Italy and assurec
their acceptance of the invitations of July 9 to come to Brussel 5
for the negotiation of a new Locarno settlement, but that this
v/as a feint, and the real intention r/as to effect a new friend-
jship v/ith Turkey. It is more likely, however, that the British
j delegation, seeing all the delegates against them, realized that
•they could not possibly win their point, and rather than cause
the failure of the conference, they gave in.
Article 20 stated that in v/artime, Turkey being belligerent,
"the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretioi
( 22 )
of the Turkish Government." This article was taken directly
from the British draft and gave Turkey more pov/er than she had
given herself in her draft; the Turkish draft had specified only
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they passed the Straits.
Article 21 removed one of the ipain objections Turkey had
to the Lausanne Straits Convention: "should Turkey consider
herself to be threatened with imminent danger of V7ar she shall
have^ the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of the
(23)
present convention." The rest of the article in the British
draft, providing that Turkey discontinues the measures if tv/o-
thirds of the Coimcil of the League felt that they are unjusti-
fied, v/as also included. Japan, as a non-member of the League,
objected and insisted that a further clause be added making it
necessary for a majority of the signatories to agree the measures
are iuijustified before Turkey should be compelled to cancel any
measures she had taken. The Soviet delegation offered the fur-
ther amendment that "vxarships and naval auEiliaries which after
having passed through the Straits prior to the use by Tut;' key
of the right conferred on it by the preceding paragraph, find
themselves separated from their hopie ports, will be authorized
to return to the said ports. It is, however, imderstood that
Turkey cannot benefit from this right the ships of the State
whose attitude had motivated the applicationcof the uresent
(24)
article." The Rumanian delegation suggested an amendment
v;hich v/ould give Turkey less complete control; "in case Turkey
should consider itself menaced by a danger of imminent war it
v/ould have the right to apply the dispositions of Article 17
(of the British draft, leaving the matter to the discretion of
23. Lpc. cit 24. Hov/ard
.
op. cit ., p.441
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Turkey) in regard to vjarships and naval auxliaries 'belonging to
(25)
the State whose attitude constituted for it such a menace." The
Turkish delegation felt it was unable to accept this amendment
since it would be difficult for Turkey to assure navigation of
v/arships in all security if the Straits were put in a state of
defense. M. Litvinov declared further that "I plead not only
in favor of the Black Sea states ^vhen I demand that ships be
authorized to return to their base. I speak for the generality
of states, for all navies in the Black Sea at a given moment,
and I propose that they be permitted to return to their base
( 26 )-
outside the Black Sea,” The right of warships to return to
their bases, as insisted on by the Soviet delegation, v/as in-
cluded in Article 21,
Section III dealt V7ith aircraft. The problem of passage
of aircraft in the region of the Straits caused much discussion
not only as to the flights over the Straits but as to the so-
vereign rights of Turkey to regulate such flights, M.Paul-
Boncour suggested that the same provisions for flights should be
made betv/een the Black and Mediterranean Seas, but M.Aras re-
marked that "the subject of our discussion is the zone of the
(27)
Straits not the rest of Turkey," According to the final so-
lution, civil aircraft may pass over Turkish territory if they
follo\7 the route indicated by the Turkish Government "outside
(28










No mention of military aircraft is made, shov/ing the failure
of the French to obtain special privileges for Russian airplane 5
coming to the assistance of France under the Franco-Soviet Pact
,
The Soviet Union v;as not too sorry about the ommission for she
really preferred immunity from attack by aircraft in the Black
Sea to the privilege of being permitted to help France. France
also failed in her attempt to obtain permission for the passage
of aircraft carriers. They v^ere not included in the category
of "light surface vessel", and the Soviet Union opposed the
suggestion on the ground that aircraft carriers in the Black
Sea might threaten her industrial regions on the Black Sea
coast
.
Section IV, "General Provisions" provides, first, that
the functions of the International Commission be transferred to
the Turkish Government (Article ?4) . The British delegation
was practically alone in its protest against complete abolition
of the International Commission of the Straits; even in its
draft it maj.ntained the commission for collecting statistics
and other information. It, said the British, provided a visible
symbol of the prii ‘ le that the Straits constituted an inter-
national v/ater\'/ay, and that its abolition might set a precedent
for the abolition of similar international bodies elsevrhere.
Hov;ever, the British abandoned the effort when it v/as clear tha1
the Turkish delegate would not consider a compromise. This
19. In international law, an "international v/aterr/ay" is a
v/aterway "open to the vessels ofl all nations upon a footing of
perfect equality with vessels of the riparian state (s)."
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insistence on the matter is cited as one of the reasons for be-
lieving that Turkey’s real motive for demanding a change v/as tc
enhance her prestige, because the International Commission as
a collector of statistics was hardly a danger to Turkish sover-
eignty or to the security of the Straits. Even the right of
the Turksih Government to collect statistics concerning the
passage of capital ships of Black Sea powers through the Strait
was questioned. Said M. Litvinov, ”Vve are not informed of the
passage of ships through the Suez Canal, the Kiel Canal and
other navigable v/ays. Why must an exception be made for the
( 30 )
Straits? Why these statistics v^hich appear useless?” • Never-
theless, the Turkish Government v/as to collect statistics to
furnish Articles 11, 12, 14, and 18 with data. Article 25 of
the same section provided that nothing in the Montreux Conven-
tion was to interfere vrith the rights and obligations of Tur-
key or the other signatories in reference to the League of Na-
tions .
Section V, ’’Final Provisions," contains regulations con-
cerning ratification, accession, duration, and revision, '^‘he
treaty was to be open to accession by any po\7er signatory to
the Treaty at Lausanne, in other vrords, Italy could sign it
later, if she wished to. By Article 28, the Convention ’'’as to
remain .in force for twenty years even though both the British
and Turkish drafts proposed fifteen years. At the end of each
five year period, each signatory v/ould be "entitled to intiate
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a proposal for amending one or more provisions;" any request fo:
a revision to Articles 14 or 18 would have to he supported hy
one other contracting power and to other articles tv/o other
contracting powers v/ould have to agree. If diplomatic channels
failed, a conference v/ould be held at v:hich Articles 14 and 18
\7ould need a three-quarters majority for revision and all others
would have to be unanimous. The latter provision did not en-
tirely please the British delegate for he went on to say Great
Britain had given their permission to certain objectionable fea-
tures only because they thought that "the five year revision..
(would) .. .not be subordinated to the veto of a pov/er, which, foi
(31)
one reason or another, would be opposed to revison."
The Annexes to the Montreux Convention v:ere of a technical
nature and v/ill not be discussed in detail. Annex I defined the
taxes and dues to be imposed by the Turkish authorities on ves-
sels passing through the Straits. Annex II provided definitions
of various types of war vessels as laid dov.Ti in the London Naval
Treaty of March, 1936. Special provision v/as made for the pas-
sage through the Straits of three old Japanese training ships
in Annex III. AnneS IV listed categories for the calculation
of tonnage passing the Straits. A final protocol permitted Tur-
key to begin remilitarizing the Straits on the day of the signa-
ture of the Convention, and to apply the nev/ regime of the Strai
as of August 15.
In accordance v/ith the final protocol, on July SO, 1936,
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the day the Montreux Convention v;as signed, an extraordinary
meeting of the Turkish Cabinet was held at Angora and on mid-
night of the same day, 30,000 Turkish troops marched into the
demilitarized zone of the Straits, where they found av;aiting
them the whole of the Turkish fleet led by the battleship Avuz
(the new name of the notorious Goeben) . The next morning Presi-
dent Kemal Ataturk toured the Straits zone. On August S4, the
International Commission of the Straits sent a message to the
Secretary-General of the League annoujicing its decision to wind
up its existence and hand over its functions to the Turkish Go-
vernment .
The Montreux Convention, entirely aside from its at least
temporary solution of the Straits problem, is important because
it represents a peaceful solution to an issue v^hich might easily
have led to v;ar and because of its influence on the larger issue^i
of naval strategy and European politics. It helped throw light
on the nev/ situation in the Mediterranean and in forcing the
governments concerned to clarify their future policies in the
light of the failure of sanctions. Although because of Articles
19, 21, and 25osome claim that it strengthened the League’s posi
tion in European politics, actually vrith it "yet another instru-
ment of international supervision vras abolished and with it a
precedent for the internationalization of various key strategic
pQSdition on the -Earth ’ slsurface \7hich have become of great value
in the future evolution of the system of collective security.(g2)
32. Routh, op, cit ,, p.586
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The signing of the Montrenz Convention coincided too ex-
actly with the outbreak of General Franco’s revolt against the
Spanish Government to he as completely effective in clearing
the air in the i-'lediterranean as it might have been. Its effect
\7as more of an indirect one of hastening the end of Mediterran-
ean naval agreements among the Sanctionist ’ s powers and possi-
bly contributing tov.'ard the signing of the Anglo-Italian Gentle-
men’s Agreement the following January.
The reaction to the Montreux Convention vmis generally fa-
vorable. Great Britain is said to haveeconsidered the budding
Turco-British friendship and its resultant reinforcement of the
balance of pov/er in the Mediterranean sufficient compensation
for not getting exactly v;hat she v/anted in the treaty. Ivlr. Eden
made a speech in the House of Commons on July S7th stating that
the nev/ settlement v/as ’’very satisfactory” because it maintained
as far as possible the principle of freedom of the Straits as
an international vraterway, and at the same time provided an out-
(33)
standing example of treaty revision by peaceful methods; He
also thanked the Turkish Government for their especial statement
at the end of the conference that they would take especial care
of the graves of those v/ho died in the Gallipoli campaign;
The Soviet Union was pleased about the improvement of the
new convention over the Lausanne Convention, but it v/as not en-
tirely satisfied, as shov/n by Litvinov’s statement at the end of
the conference: "The Conference had recognized, although in an
33. Ibid .. 0.645
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insufficient vray, the special rights of the riverain states of
the Black Sea in the Black Sea in connection with the passage of
the Straits, as well as the special geographical situation of
the Black Sea in which the general conceptions of the absolute
(34)
freedom of the seas could not be entirely applied." In scorn
toward Germany and Italy, Litvinov said that the Montreujc Con-
vention "dealt the first crushing blow against those who sought
(35)
the supremacy of brute force." The immediate press reactions
were most favorable , for the Soviet Union had certainly obtained
her main objectives. The successful compromise bety^een Great
Britain and the Soviet at the end of the conference smoothed
the way, also, for the provisional Anglo-Russian agreement reach
ed on the limitation of naval construction at the end of July.
The French Government v/as fairly well satisfied although
it had not obtained full recognition of regional pacts, but it
had hopes, which v^ere shared by Rumania, Greece, and Jugoslavia,
that the detente reached at the end of the Conference would lead
to a Mediterranean Pact.
Greece also approved and announced that she v;as in no hurr
to refortify the islands of Lemnos and Samothrace, although she
now had the right to do so. The Bulgarians regarded the nev/
convention as a precedent for the revision of the Treaty of Neui'
and seemed to have hopes, after the rapprochement it reached
34 . Howard , op . c it , , p . 446
35. George Glasgow, "Turkey and the Straits," The Contemporarv
Review, 157, April, 1940, p.495
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with its Balkan neighbors, of being invited to join any Mediter-
ranean Pact. Poland, Hungary, and japan expressed -^their appro-
val of the successful conclusion of the conference.
Germany, as just mentioned, pointedly expressed her dis-
approval. Germany had had an unofficial observer at the Mon-
treux Conference, v/ho took home a full report of the discussions .
The German press belittled the importance of the Convention and
commented on the fickleness of British policy. On February 26,
1937, the German Government informed the Turkish Government
through diplomatic channels that certain clauses in the Montreu3
Convention were not regarded with favor by Germany, particularly
those relating to the egress of Soviet v/arships into the Medi-
terranean. The Turkish Government v/as somev:hat concerned, but
merely retorted that since Gemnany v;as neither a signatory of
the Montreux Convention nor a Mediterranean pov/er, the matter
v/as no business of hers, and Turkey 77ould"brook no interference
(36)
in matters vital to her security."
The hostile attitude of Italy is much more important be-
cause she is a Mediterranean power and v;as a signatory of the
Lausanne Convention. Italy’s attitude before the Montreux con-
ference has already been discussed; at the opening of the Mon-
treux Conference there was an interview betv^een Count Ciano, Ita
lian Foreign Minister, and the Turkish Ambassador to Rome. Italjr
objected to the Turkish desire for remilitarization while the
Turkish ambassador tried to explain that Italy should have an
36. Routh, op. cit ., p.648
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interest in it to check the increase of German influence in Soutli
East Europe. The next day the Italian press attacked Turkey say|
ing her request v/as a hacio/.^rd step in international relations,
merely a continuation of British snctionist policy against Italy
that Italy v;as not ready to say "amen” to the decisions of the
'Ontrerx: Convention. The Turkish press retorted that "the dis-
cussion of a question vital to tther nations cannot he nostponed
(37)
bo suit the convenience of Italy." The Italian government con-
trolled press went on to say that Italy vrould not consider the
raising of sanctions as a sufficient concession to obtain her
renewed cooperation in the affairs of Europe, but that the raisii
cf sanctions would put an end to the "uneasy situation in the
mediterranean" which had been Turkey^ s chief pretext for remili-
(38)
g
:arizing the Straits. It seemed clear that the condition of
[taly’s attendance at the Montreux Convention would have been the
removal not only of the economic sanctions but of the military
md political sanctions implied in the reinforcement of the Eri-
:ish fl^et in the Mediterranean and the continuation of the Medi-
terranean naval arrangements between Great Britain, France, Greec
Jugoslavia, and Turkey. This was not done, but the pov/ers still
loped for Italian cooperation until July 5 when it became obvious
;hat Italy intended to continue sulking. After the British con-
cessions the Italian attitude v.^as even more unfriendly, since
Mhe felt they were aimed at her; not even the British decision
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rily added to the British fleet in the Mediterranean and the
July 15th annomcement ttiat the French Government regarded thei:)'
naval arrangements with the British Mediterranean fleet as ter-
minated succeeded in soothing the irate Italians.
Italy’s stubbornness increased the hostility of the other
states toward her; their feeling \7aslthat Italy would have to
adhere to the Montreux Convention any\/ay, but that it was too
bad that Italian absence from the Conference prevented any more
general discussion toward reestablishing a normal situation in
the Mediterranean, On July 13, M. Aras made a declaration
intended to convey the impression the Turkish delegation did
not \7ish the Convention to be left open to the signature of po-
wers not present at the Conference, but that it reserved the
right to sign bilateral agreements on the basis of the new
Convention. Four days before the signing of the treaty, M.Aras
had an interviev/ with the permanent representative of Italy at
Geneva and, in the final text of the Convention, provision v/as
made for subsequent Italian adherence.
After sighing of the Montreux Convention, the Italian presll!
described it as ’’unrealistic” because it took "no account of the!
dynamism in European politics” and as valueless since it lacked
(39)
the signature of one of the powers most directly affected. The]
Italian Government was not only bitter about the matter because
of its injured prestige, but it disliked increased Soviet influ-
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ranean and also the success Great Britain vras having in v/inning
Turkey's friendship.
Turkey, feeling secure in its friendships with the Soviet
Union and Great Britain and its ov/n strength decided not to
press the matter. Turkey could, also, alv/ays discriminate ag-
ainst Italian commercial ships if she insisted on v/arship rights
under the old regime. The President of the Turkish Cabinet re-
marked at the beginning of August: "those who have a policy of
international peace at heart will have profit from collaboratioi




In a short time, Italy had realized the v/eakness of her
position and decided to cultivate Turkish friendship. At the
end of July, she informed Turkey, Greece, and Jugoslavia of her'
peaceful intentions in the eastern Mediterranean and informed
Turkey that she still considered herself bound by the Turco-Ita-
lian Pact of 19B8. Friendly feelings vrere encouraged when the
Turkish representative v.^s the first to be removed from Addis
Ababa vrithout v/aiting for a decision from Geneva. A dispute
between the t\7o powers over the passage of tvio Spanish ships
was not nearly so serious as it might have been. By the end of
January, 1937, the Italian press announced that direct conver-
sations would take place on the iniative of Turkey and made
it clear that adherence would come about only on two conditions
,
first, that no discrimination be made against Italy for being a
40 . Loc. cit7
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late-coraer, and, secondly, that any decision v^hich might have
to he referred to the League Council under Article 21 of the
Covenant would also he referred to the Italian Government in
view of her facto absence from Geneva, On February 2 and 3,
1237, a meeting \ms held between Count Ciano and M. Aras. Accor-
ding to the Italian press, Italy definitely wanted concessions
and also v/as concerned v;ith the Straits regime only in so far
as it affected Turkey and not v'ith the Ivlontreux Convention as
(41)
a v;hole. The conversations v/ere said to be only a”prefece”.
No agreements v;ere officially made at that time. It v/as not
until May 2, 1938, after Turkey had given facto recognition
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THE STRAITS DURING VfORLD WAR II

As far as the Straits were concerned, the period from the
Montreux Convention to the beginning of the Second "'orld ’.-ar v/as
a calm one. In February, 1937, the Turkish Government had an-
nounced a special increase of about twenty million dollars in
Turksih military estimates to be devoted to refortification and
also the placing of a fifteen million dollar contract vzith an
English firm for the erection of steel-works in northern Turkey.
From then on, Turkey v,^s busy building a carefully planned net-
work of defense and attack positions; modern defenses were built
on both sides of the Straits, v/hile roads were built in the
neighboring areas to permit the rushing up of heavy artillery
as fast as possible. Large quantities of mines v/ere prepared
for any emergency.
In Turkey as a vrhole
,
an intensive process of nationaliza-
tion vra.5 itill going on. Foreigners, especially Germans, became
more and more umpopular. German spies were arrested; German
professors in Turkish schools were dismissed. Turkey’s relation]^
with Britain and the Soviet Union v/ere even friendlier than be-
fore. In the eatly part of 1939, Turkey had great hopes for
further cooperation among her friends. An Anglo-French treaty
with Russia was being contemplated, and the Soviet Union approved
of a Turco-British treaty. On May 12, Ivir. Chamberlain announced
that a treaty of mutual aid and assistance v;as going to be drawn
up soon betvreen Turkey and Britain. On June 23, the French and
Turkish governments issued a joint statement to the same effect
(
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between them. Germany v/atched this grov/ing friendship with ap-
prehension. On August 24
f
the Soviet Union signed a non-aggres-|
sion pact v/ith Germany to the astonishment of the Turkish govern-
ment; in Septem'ber, the Soviet Union attacked Finland. The Tur-j
kish people had always felt close to the Finns, and looked on
the Soviet attack as almost a hetrayal of themselves.
However, since it wished to have a free field of action
in the Balkans, the Soviet Government was still anxious to re-
tain its firendly relations with Turkey. In Septem'ber, the Tur-|
kish Foreign Ilirnster, Shiikru Saracoglu, vras invited to Moscov;;
Turkey hoped that the non-aggression pact ‘betv/een Turkey and thd
Soviet Union, to stabilize the balance of power in the Black Seq
might still be signed. Stalin tried to get Saracoglu to agree
not to apply Article 19 if the Soviet Union should be the "ag-
gressor” and to keep the Straits closed to v/arships hostile to
her. Saracoglu replied that Turkey had the best v/ill in the
world to oblige the Soviet Union, but that she had been appointejj:
guardian of the Straits by all 1he signatories of the Convention
and could not undettake to favor one at the expense of the otherit
Negotiations broke do^’m on October 17, with hopes expressed on
both sides of future more fruitful conversations.
This blow did not, however, prevent Turkey, in fact probab||Ly
encouraged her to, from signing a treaty of mutual assistance
on October 19 with Great Britain and France. Article 2 (1) read
"In the event of an act of aggression by a European pov/ereleadinj
;
to war in the Mediterranean area in which France and the United
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(1
Kingdom and will lend her all aid and assistance in her power."
Article £ (S) read the same hutiw/ith the names interchanged.
However, Turkey was not going to risk alienating the Soviet Un-
ion: Protocol 2 read that "the obligations undertaken by Tur-
key in virtue of the above-mentioned Treaty cannot compel that
country to take action having as its effect, or involving as it
(2
consequence, entry into armed conflict with the Soviet Union."
Articles 4 and 5 provide for consultation in case of aggression
not specifically involving active participation and secure for
Great Britain and France at least Turkey’s benevolent neutrality
in case of aggression against either of the tv70 states.
The treaty made a bad impression in both Moscovr and BerliijL
Neither would believe that it was not directed at a particular
state. Soviet and Turkish relations became colder; the Germans
were hot at all adverse to helping this ‘feeling along. German
sources spread tales of Russian designs on India and of Turkish
plans to destroy the oil-wells at Baloi. They even v/ent so far
as to hint that the terrible earthquake, which occurred in eas-
tern Asia Minor at the end of 1939 \7as a result of divine v.Tath
at Turkish abandonraent of her former ally, Germany,
Up imtil 1944, Turkey adhered to the Montreux Convention
to the best of her ability although there were complaints on
both sides, of a fairly minor nature. The Straits, in accordanc
with Article 19, v;ere closed to v/arships of belligerents. From
1. James T. Shotv/ell and Francis Deak. Turkey at the ^traits,
Nev/ York, 1940, p.l69 2. Ibid.
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September, 1939, to Liarch, 1940, this v/orked a hardship on
Britain and France, for the interference with Soviet-German
trade in the Black Sea v7ould have helped their canse consider-
ably. The Treaty of Mutual Assistance obviously was not yet
applicable as the v;ar had not reached the Mediterranean area.
With the entrance of Italy on the side of Germany in Tune, 194 D,
just as France V7as on the verge of collapse, the v;ar came, al-
though not actively, to the area. Turkey vTas not expected to,
nor did she shov/ any willingness to join Britain in her lone
fight against the Axis.
In the fall of 1940, an event occurred, which has been
revealed only since the end of the V7ar, proving that the Sovie ;
Union v/as still very much interested in gaining control of the
Straits. On October 13, 1940, the Soviet Union v;as asked to
sign the pact already signed by Germany, Italy, and Japan. T
Tv7o secret protocols v/ere to be dravm up, one dividing the
British Empire among the four powers, the Soviet’s being givei
a piece "to the South of the territory of the Soviet Republics
in the direction of the Indian Ocean" and the other providing
that Germany and Italy give the Soviet Union additional rights
,
(3)
but not bases, in the Straits. Hovjever, Molotov said the
Soviet Union would not sign the protocols imless: (1) The firs:
protocol vTas amended to give the Soviet Union specifically "th
5
area south of Baku and Batum in the direction of the Persian
Gulf;" (2) the second protocol included "the granting of bases
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for the U.S.S.R.’s land and sea forces at the Bosphorus and Bar*'
danelles:" (3) a protocol vjas added giving the Soviet Union
(4)
special rights in Bulgaria. The German government did not an-
swer this until pressed to dosso in January of 1941 and then
said only "the German government adheres to those ideas pro-
(5)
posed to Herr Molotov at the time of his visit to Berlin."
Soviet-German relations Became vjorse after this and finally led
to the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. in June, 1941. Germany
had safeguarded her relations with Turkey By signing a non- ag-
gression pact with her only a few days Before she invaded the
Soviet Unioh.
As v/ar approached Turkish territory in 1941, there were
several incidents and accusations. In the late spring, re-
ports were circulated that Geimany had asked Turkey for complete
militaiy control of the Straits, and Russia, Being informed of
the German demand, had proposed sharing control of the Straits,
a proposition rejected By the Germans. The full details are
not yet known, and this may merely be a garbled report of the
proposed four pact. This v/ould account for the hurried landings
on the Greek Islands, according to London reports. It v.^s a my-
stery where the German troops \7hich landed on Samothrace and
Lemnos came from. Some British authorities at the time Believed
they had come through the Straits on German merchantmen and had
escaped detection By keeping Belov/ the hatches. In line with
4
4. Loc. cit 5. Loc. cit.
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this theory, British authorities asked the Turkish govermnent tc
stop such vessels and search them; however, the Turkish govern-
ment seemed to he satisfied by the German explanation that they
v/ere carrying cereals from Bulgaria to Greek ports occupied by
the Germans, and, therefore, there was no violation of the Mon-
treux Convention. In 1941, also, Germany tried to make a deal
v/ith Turkey by which Italian destroyers would be bought by and
sent to Bulgaria, a neutral in the Soviet-German;iv/ar. Since
this V7as obviously merely a way to escape the regulations of
the Montreux Convention, Turkey refused.
The Soviet Union, in her note of August, 1946, mentioned
two incidents during the summer of 1941, as evidence of Turkey^
s
negligence. One of these was the passage of the 37 ton vedette
boat, Seefalke, ’’flying a commercial flag and not figuring in
“
( 6 )
the yearbook of war fleets” on July 6, 1941. ’’This boat vras
not armed and carried only a big buoy and a life-saving canoe.
No indication v/as discovered that coiild have implied any use
(7)
for war aims.” The Turkish claim is that the fault \ms not in
Turkey’s handling of the situation, but in the definition and
tonnage requirements in the Montreux Convention itself. The
second incident concerned the Italian tanker Tarvisio : ’’the
Tarvisioncrossed the Straits in Jime, 1941, as a merchant boat.
Passage of the boat was called to the attention of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs as a fraudulent case seeing that the ship in
question figured also on the list of auxiliary ships of the
New York Times
, A^ust 25, 1946, p.l2. 7. Loc. clt.
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Italian v/ar fleet. V/hen the Italian embassy v;as asked for expla-|
nations, it affirmed that the Tarvisio v;as crossed off the list
of auxiliary ships and was navigating exclusively for coramercia]
purposes. The Government of the republic ordereddauthorities
to arrest the Tarvisio at the next attempt to cross. The Tar-
visio presented itself a second time on August 19, 1941, at the
( 8 )
(9
entrance to the Dardanelles. Passage -ms refused.” The Tur-
kish: note goes on to say that the Turkish govennment did not
change its point of viev/ about not recognizing the right "to
transform auxiliary ships into merchant vessels during wartime.’
"The Soviet ambassador, during a visit to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on August S5, 1941, expressed the gratitude of the Sovi^‘
government for the decision" of the Turkish government and its
( 10 )
agreement with the Turkish vievm There seems to be no reason
not to believe the Turkish report since Turkey professed herself
to be a].loyal signatory of the Pact of 1939 and, also, since
there v;ere relatively fev/ complaints, and these were divided
betv;een the two belligerent groups.
Concerning her obligations under the Mutual Assistance
Treaty, Turkey had done nothing; "in the summer of 1941, Turkey
informed Germany that she would not grant unopposed passage to
German troops, and when the German offensive did not come off,
her cynical statesmen credited Turkish neutrality alone with
having protected British interests in the Near and Middle East."
9. Loc. cit.
( 11 )
8. Loc. cit. 10. Loc. cit.
11. Heinz Eulau, "Turkey and the Straits," New Republic, vol.ll




-.’trT 'j 'io'r ZF^-'r nr-}r.ljf>il 9ri<f norf*' . •J-oei'i *ifw- rtElIacfl S'
•tail oiW i'lo lozr.o'io cx-a' olRj-.vxY.: 9aM d*x ^ertolJ'Jn
J
iBxoioiiX^CD TO*! j;a:i:iB3^ivxri bbv; ^/ta atf^rfa VT:j8J:Xi:s:(j-x xo
t
aoiit oii'dlrqaT: ©rfc’- lo cJ'xtoraii'iavfX) edT ,39P.oqruq
I;
-'TbT 3jc^ .ecb'tc Go- d-fTr©;j-^3 .txon ericJ- oiexviBj.' arfct d-a©‘x*xjD oc^AS'
, .1 d'SLf-iiT- no onrxd Tihooi^g b 3:Iee^ i BOonoaeTg oi:sxv !,
(<;)
xnT '. -oeu'ioT ar- .^^IX‘3.:£-"''''T:jt^ 3r{(t ocl’ 3oxto'ccfn& j
f|
J-on x)xX iiit3£tiniiavo'> erl-t d-arlo ysa Ov* no soo', acforturfa ? :'. !
!}
od-” oifd d-on djLfod“p vjoJiv lo dnxoq edx ^
y
,'^’iLt^'ir^-v ‘xr/'inr sIogbsv d'lrBifo^ m odn! eqxrfc yt - IxXjO;*' rrxo ;v3fr/>id
xr?.!©':© ! "to :\l. i o3- diolv x? ;:^f:l'XJLr£> ,T:of>Bea/:(i{iB d-aivoci arlT*’ t
(0)
1, I ,.
d)jji.v9b Oxid e£>i/:. aild toaeo^cors d-Qtr.\ix.-. no aTrxn'ttA




ii xior-jrai on o ; od cir.9oa ©‘tori': . ’oiv risi::^-T;f';’ ."n • n-'X"/ drie. iG9‘it}6
'tloc'xsr fco3 nri'toT:q yo:>f‘LXi'r ©onXs f^e.bInu'J SfO O'roMod' od d*on ;|
©ty-i’'"' t'oEl' ,L»ni? .0201 lo do.s'f 0£[J vxorfx;it^jXa Ir^^olbe ©cf cd ,
I>oM-v.(’ij n'lev; oaorid vb‘?lcxr::)0 wo I; Ylsvxd^’j T ©^xo' * ©narid S
5
,i3''--rc’iv. d.noiox.xl.’lotf c '.d and noowd©cf!l
©o‘^*?daJ:eaA liu/dn;; ©xld' iof»rur a'rroxdBjvlIcfo nofl - iilnrrcorroO
!
vo^iti/.T V ‘io o Qdt ur-' y :i‘ii-to.n 9nof> hbn ye:lX- y-'di^eiT
' od GSBflaflft Jc^i3oqqo^^f d:iL'X: don i- ftrov uii3 dx^d .i-rto: oaxmo-ni
,:7o ef^.o': don fii o'Sfxano'i'^o n.'ui'nod ©rv1 nonw.bnn , sqootr-d a©u»T.aO|J




’’,da£>3 oXIiCvli!. ftn;? ibO/i osit nl Rda&T.Vdax ileldl'Ki bodcadoiq ycxv.-rf
,-^io ’ .or . -»- xo .oot.- .dxo .oo^r .8
ff •*<
•''''







Britain, according to the Pact, should have sent materials and
ttoops to Turkey if she needed them and had been unable to do so
in her difficult military state.
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During 194S and 1943, no incidents in the Straits attracte
the particular attention of either side. The Soviets did accuse
the Turkish authorities in their notes of A-ugust, 1946, of per-
mitting questionable German commercial shipping through the
Straits in November and December of 1942. Hov/ever, the Turkish
government retorted that "no German commercial ships went thro-
(12
ugh the Straits in November and December, 1942, as it is claimed
It v;ent on to say that "between January 1, 1943 and January 1, 1^44,
only ten commercial ships of 19, 476 total tonnage and whose
commercial status was observed definitely by authorities con-
(13)
cerned, passed through the Straits for the Black Sea,"
Hov/ever, although the Straits regime v;as running smoothly,
Turkey itself v/as grov;ing closer and closer to active cooperation
with the Allies. Vfhile Anglo-Turkish negotiations were procee-
ding in September, 1943, the Soviet Journal launched an attack
on Turkey for her neutrality, accusing her of’benevolent neu-
trality toward Germany, of thereby ensuring the safety of Ger-
many’s Balkan flank, "and stating that"if Turkey had not been
(14)
neutral, Germany could hotchave fought on the Soviet front."
The reason for this attack, which did, as hoped, embarrass Great!
i
Britain, was Soviet alarm over the close collaboration between i
’
I
12. Nevf York Times
. August 25, 1946, p, 12
Loc . ciTI 14. Eulau, op, cit .. p.lOl
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the tv70 states, Churchill himself had conferred with Turkish
leaders earlier in the year after the Casablanca Conference, and
the British had been building air fields in Turkish Asia Minor.
Eden’s conference \vith the Turkish governiaent in November failed
to bring Turkeyj into the war, for which the Soviet Union was glac,
because she v/anted Turkey to enter on her o\m terms, not on Grea1
Britain’s,
In the fall of 1943, before the Teheran Conference, Genmn^'
sounded the Soviet Union out on making a separate peace. The
latter gave Germany the impression she would sign one if Germany i
would agree to: ”(1) recognition of Soviet annexation of the
Baltic states; (2) Russian control of the Dardanelles; (3) Rus-
sian expansion south and east to Gv/adar on the Arabian Sea; (4)
|
lerraan support of Soviet demands for control of Dairen in Man-
|
(15) I
churia," Germany refused to agree to such Russian control of
|
the Middle East.
The Soviet Union, \mdaunted in her desires, decided to pre^
the Allies. It is reported that she unofficially made it clear
bo Churchill and Roosevelt at Teheran in November that she wanted
iccess to the Straits as one of the rewards for her long fight
igainst Germany. This conference, from a realistic point of view
nerely set up spheres of interest, and Turkey fell under the
Soviet one. At discussions held after Teheran, the Turkish pre-
sident asked Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt if
they were willing to guarantee Turkish independence against the
' L5l Time, vol.48, December 23, 1946, p.26
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Soviet Union if she should try to make Turkey a Soviet satellit'j
and possibly annex the Straits, In reply, ”-&hile assuring Pres -
ident Inonu that Moscovr had no territorial aspirations in Tur-
key, Britain and America cautioned him to get on well with the
Soviet Union since Turkey could not count on the aid of British-
(16)
American troops if a Russo-Turkish split developed." The Soviet
Union had won the first round in her struggle to gain control
over the Straits.
1944 saw the growing annoyance of Great Britain and the
Soviet Union with Turkey, still adamant in her decision to main-
tain the Montreux Convention and shov/ no partiality, even after
Italy’s defeat. In l/Iareh, Turkey refused to permit ex-Italian
fleet units to join the Soviet fleet imits in the Black Sea, a
move which vrould not only have restored complete control of the
B].ack Sea to the Soviet Union, hut would have placed her in a
position potentially strong enough to launch a land and am-
phibious campaign against the Balkans, especially Rumania. As
it v;as, the Soviet fleet had suffered heavy losses from German
air attacks v/hile, on the other hand, a few German submarines
had been shipped doun the Danube,and Rumanian monitors, gunboatii,
and some altered transport craft had given the enemy a small
navy in the Black Sea.
In Ivlarch, it was announced that, since Turkey v/as not hel-
ping the Allies, the latter would no longer send Turkey arms.
In April, Great Britain gained f or.: the Allies the greatest
IBI Eulau, op. cit .r p.lOl
n- -r. •*
-i :^»rr • rrjacaL -- ~^=i- f ' /<i(tiif>ii««iS’liil
'}
cl’o.tvoo Q xo'£*tu‘^ QZi^. oj- viJ- />l£roil 3 QiiQ tt noxfi'j' ^elvo8
-ao'ii xoartB vjl'iineoq jbnB
-tuV ni enoi.d^p'iiviR'r, o/i i»:uf v.»oosc!I ctj3x(cf i/noni 3
f





-rfBf.tr'i '<' J&^ ' no ctAix/cr ton £).£i/,oo xbz(isjT ooalc noXxiU .'.oivoG ,'
;
'
' (01)- ^ ^
'i





’ ioTt-Too ni£;:j oJ of- ;-xr*^T8 i >r' at Jbra/oa crr.aXO: or(t nov' Ljsri /c-'-inU li
i
,'e/xp‘rtx ©fit a©VO
^ ©/It f an ftJ ‘C- rT:«T tB‘Vj‘1 0:n oofr.-’7:o.'rnx« ©fit vrx:^ i-eCI
•
ot ftoxGrtv.a' '- ->xi f'i tnar.nf.. IXite .yasiaixT lUX- aoxii.' t ilvc3 \
J-
- '




. txiA OCT dj :joPt< :©'j. ^'8:Xi/fx t .tf' i©b ci’^^Xoti*
I :l
j «
, -Or. zionl'i erlv nX k Miff' t<^©I’:: toXvc3 ©fit nXo,*;. ot atinxr toaXO: |
*©:it “lo Xc-’tJcc.'0 .^t ..'t ©vofi '':Xno to:: ^Sjj(rf rlol^l'.v ©vo£: j




-/TB bni- cu-bI b donutyX ^no^dto 'IXBxtrioto ; noxtt.eoq






It /iBpirt©-' rTctX aarcoi yyeod i>o't©‘lltr£ bed d?vl'x doJvoB ©nt .sbt/ tX
ft
a •Ttx'ir.vX- '. fi.cxTto wo'^ l 'r.'/itc ©if- i: <'XXrf.
*
ixb '.
.l-BOffn .a- otiiiOiV fiBXfiBOfL^H fi:ixqecfx/apfi ©rit rr-roi) i
*'




XX.'xH .' y: ©r;-t crit nov!'' tioaeriBit oni p. bnr j
.jcte??, :.op[,q 9iit at YV£a




s\r- '”'->>{‘1 "'^ /tjfop 'f feXi/o’'^ a 1 7 oX o.i<j xXX-- ©fit 7*^-^
I ©fit- 3©xXXa Oil--’ - TK/ 5 b 'iIj ' n i. - tB©iv- . Xxtq*. jj




Turkish concession up to that time, v^^hen she demanded that Tur-
key stop her chrome shipments to Germany. It is doubtful, hov7-
ever, that Turkey would have conceded even this if she still re-
tained any fear of Nagi military might. The most serious diffi-
culty came in June, 1944, when Great Britain accused Germany of
trying to move a fleet of small combat ships disguised as mer-
chantmen through the Straits to the Aegean. The British claimed
that, although the ships were \marmed, they v:ere obviously in-
tended to be anaed and to remain war vessels. The Tujrkish au-
thorities persisted that they could find no evidence on examina-
tion the ships v;ere other than commercial vessels. According to
later Turkish reports, "they v:ere unarmed, had commercial ship-
ping space and during passage were loaded with lumber, coal, and
(17)
hay." Moreover, "the German embassy confirmed that (they) be-
longed to private maritime agencies and were travelling vjith
I
(18)
only commercial purposes." The matter became so serious that
discussions v;ere held about it in the House of Commons, one mem-
ber urging that Britain should send Turkey a bill for any damage
caused to the Allied by the freed ships. Finally, after a number
of these ships had passed the Straits, passage was refused the
others; according to the Turkish report, passage was refused
"when the British embassy informed the Foreign Office of very
reliable information to the effect that some of these ships that
tiad gone through the Straits were under order of the navy or
(19)
were being used as troop transports."
17. Nev/ York Times, August 25,1946 ,p. 12. 18.Loc.cit. 19.Loc.cit.
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In In August, 1944, Turkey severed relations with Germany,
and the Allies began to feel that perhaps they could make full
use of the Straits. However, they did not have it until after
January, 1945, when the German air bases in the Ionian Sea and
the Balkans were effectively neutralized. As a British commen-
tator said, "there (v/as) really nothing political about it. It
(was) purely a military matter which had been solved by a change!
( 20 )
in military events." The necessity of cleaning up the mine
fields delayed the immediate and complete use of the Straits.
Since the Allies had no further use of the supply line through
Iran, built to take the place of a route through the Straits,
the route closed dov.Ti. On February 23, 1945, Turkey finally
declared war on Germany and Japan. Actually there v/as little
gained from this except for the increase in supplies, escorted
by Allied warships, if needed. Apparently, Turkey declared v^ar
officially chiefly because she had been told such a course was
necessary for her full participation in the coming San Francisco|
Conference.
In conclusion, the Montreux Convention was observed V7ith
very minor exceptions by all the powers having occasion to use
the Straits, including non-signatory as v/ell as signatory powersj
However, the restraint of the tv70 sides was not one due to ethics.
As mentioned before, the Straits v/ere closed to Britain and
France in 1939 and 1940, when they might have stopped Gerraan-Rus|-
so commercial shipping if they had been able to send vjarships
20. Hew York Times
. January 13, 1945, p,2
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into the Black Sea; however, the Allies did not wish to chance
driving Turkey to war on the side of the A±is. After the end
of the Soviet-Finhish struggle and the French surrender, the
v;ar area r.^s not near the Straits until the spring of 1941.
Then, German forces began to arrive simultaneously on the coasts
of the Black Sea and the Aegean. Germany v;as so v/ell-supplied
with land communications for her operations in the Balkans and
in South Russia it was not necessary for her to call on her
meagre naval and mercantile resources to transfer mentor mater-
ials from one sea to another. In addition, she still did not
v;ish to ''precipitate Turkey prematurely into the arms of the
Allies by attempting to force” a passage through the Straits.
On the other hand, although the Allies were in great need of a
passage through the Straits to help the Soviet Unidin, German
control in the area was too effective, and an alternative route
through Persia had to be laid out. At no time were the Straits
necessary as an active line of attack, since the Soviet Union
was not at \7ar with a major Mediterranean power; Italy had li-
mited naval resources, and v/hat resources there v;-ere were held
in check elsewhere.
In accordance with the last paragraph, Turkey* s problem \m
never one of actual defense of the Straits, but merely one of
proper and fair regulation of the passage of all ships on the
basis of the Montreux Convention. This role she played v/ell;
Turkey herself said she "filled the role of guardian of the Stra
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bequeathed to it by history” viith ”a correctness pushed some-
times' to fanaticism that even disdained the proper interests
(22)
of Turkey*” Moreover, since the ”watch kept by Turkish au-
thorities on transit ships through the Straits v/as complicated
by the fact that the only kind of control that the ships could
be submitted to, according to the convention, vjas a sanitary
control effected ’during the day and the night’ v/ith the most




rors than Turkey did. .Turkey went on to say that any complaints
about the Straits regime should not be aimed at ”the intrinsic
dispositions which regulate the properly legal aspect of the
regime...but rather at the definition of warships, their speci-
fications as well as the tonnage, vdiich form the purely tech-
(24)
nical appendix of the convention.”
2£, New York Times
.
August 25, 1946, p*12
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Even thougH the Soviet Union started her campaign on the
control of the Straits in the spring of 1945, while the war was
still going on, her objectives were all post-war and more close>|-
ly related to ' post-war developments than to the war itself.
At the Yalta Conference in February, where post-war policies
toward Germany, Poland, and Yugoslavia were discussed, the Sovi|
et Union informed the British and French governments that she
wished a revision of the Montreux Convention. Britain had als<j
regained her interest in revision,but along the lines of inter-
nationalization, since her position in Greece and the Aegean Se^
had been reinforced. No pcBitive move was taken at the Confer-
ence, but the Allies v^ere said to have agreed that somerevision
should take place.
On Ivlarch 20, the Soviet Union denounced the Russo-Turkish
treaty of friendship which the tv:o had signed in 1925 and which
was to come up for renewal in November. The Soviet Union wishec
to make amore positive alliance from which She could gain the
concessions on the Straits question she v/anted. In June, she
demanded that "prior to any international discussion of the re-
vision of the obsolete Montreux Convention governing the contro .
and administration of the Black Sea Straits, the Turkish govern|-
ment should agree to grant the U.S.S.R. rights to strategic de-
fensive bases in the Straits area... the exact nature or locatioHi
(1 )
of the bases v^as not specified." ^Certain French sources thougiit
1. New York Times
.
August 4, 1945, p.l
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that the Soviets had suggested the Turkish government mann the
bases during peacetime and the Russians during wartime. Second!
the Soviet Union suggested that ’’after an accord on this point
was reached in principle, an international conference of inter-
ested powers should he held to revise the Montreux Convention
and the Turks should agree to uphold the Soviet view before the
(2)
conference is held." Thirdly, it vi^s suggested "that specific
talks should commence between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey concerning
the cession of the Turkish border ar^as of Kars, Ardahan, and
(3)
Artvin to Soviet Armenia." The latter demand has been regardec
"as a bargaining object and students of Turkish history v/ere of
the opinion that Moscow might forego it if the other two vrere
(4)
accepted by Turkey." It v/as also suggested that Turkey accept
certain changes to be made in the Balkans in favor of some of
the smaller states.
Turkey, quite naturally, \ms annoyed by these demands.
She kept Britain infoimied of all negotiations through normal
diplomatic channels, and one wtiter says "therefore it may be
assumed that Russia’s reuqests v;ere directed at much at Britain
(5)
as much as at Turkey."
The Soviet Union made other suggestions during this period also;
the Ankara radio reported she had proposed another treaty which
would close the Straits to the warships of all foreign pov/ers
y
. Loc* cit* 3 , Loc , cit.
4, A. J. Fisher, "The Dardanelles," The Central EuTopean Observer
August 30, 1946, p.271
5. Heinz Eulau, "Turkey and the Straits," Reuublic
. vol.113.
July 25, 1945, p.lOO
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except Tiirke:/ and the Soviet Union. She also hinted later on at
the possibility of settlement by bilateral agreement to v;hich
the British ansvrered, "this is one of several problems affecting
the destinies of the Middle East v/hich are ripe for preliminar|r
discussion by the Three Pov;ers in common in preparation for
their joint discussion wlthlthe other countries directly affecte
, .Such consultation v;ould not only have the advantage of elimin-
ating the misunderstanding likely to arise from the isolated
treatment of issues which may have repercussions reaching far
beyond their nominal scope and content .also prepare the v;ay
for common policies in a large and vital region of the vrorld."
On August 4, Soviet-Turco discussions were halted; the Turkish
government rejected flatly Soviet demands for territorial con-
cessions and base privileges in the Straits area. She refused
to discuss the problem any further while the Soviet Union still
had such concessions in mind.
It was inevitable, then, that the question of the Straitjj
should be brought up by the Soviet Union at the Potsdam Confer-
ence in August. It v/as reported that the Straits problem became
rather critical during the conference. The Soviet Union demandec.
control of the Straits defenses. Britain refused outright, whil(s
the United States presented as a compromise a proposal for inter-'
national control which would protect free navigation and not im-
pair Turkish sovereignty.
The United States was urging internationalization of all
|
6 . New York Times. July 24, 1945, p.ll
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and Trijman stated "one of the persistent causes for
wars in Europe in the last tv^o centuries has been the selfish
control of the waterways of Europe, I mean the Danube, the
i
Black Sea Straits, the Rhine, the Kiel Canal and all the inland
waterv/ays of Europe v;hich border two or more states. The United
States proposed at Berlin that there be free and unrestricted
navigation of these inland v/ater’.vays. We thinlc this is importan
to the future and security of the world. ;^e proposed the regu-
lation for such navigation be provided by international author-
ities. The function of the agencies would be to develop the use
of the waterways and assure equal treatment bn them for all na-
tions .. ,Membership on the agencies would include the United States
Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France ulus those states
(7)
v;hich border on the watervmys," Although Turkey was willing toj
accept internationalization if it included a guarantee of her
sovereignty and also that it was not merely a stepping stone to
more demands, the Soviets refused to consider such a solution.
The matter v/as postponed.
At the meeting of the Big Three in Berlin during October,
it was agreed to split the Dardanelles question from the question
of the Danube, the Elbe, and (bther v/ater\'/ays of Europe. The
United States, still v/orking on its project of internationalizinj^
the vfaterway^jhad suggested that all such water routes except
the Dardanelles be internationalized, but this too had been re-
fused. The decision on the Dardanelles v.mis that each pov/er
7, Harry N.Hov^rard
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approach Turkey on the matter separately through diplomtic
I
channels v;ith its^ov.Ti proposals.
The British and American governments vrere reported to he
working together on common opinion toward the issue. On
November 2, v/ithout consultation with the British on the final
draft, the United States presented Turkey with its proposals:
"(1) The ^^traits to be opened to the merchant vessels of all
nations at all times; (2) The Straits to be opened to the tran-
sit of the warships of Black Sea powers at all times except
with the specific consent of the Black Sea pov/ers, or except
v;hen acting under the authority of the U.N. ; (4) Certain change
to modernize the Montreux Convention, such as the substitution
of the U.N. organization for the League of Nations and the
s
elimination of Japan as a signatory.” Substantially, these
proposals v/ere little changed from the provisions of the Mon-
treux Convention.
The British government sent a note to Turkey on November
21, not setting out any particular proposals but stating its
willingness to take part in any international conference to
consider revision of the Montreux Convention and also its de-
sire to reserve it exact point of vievr until then. It added
that the matter did not seem urgent to the British government.
It V7as also reported that the British government, while agree-
ing V7ith the American note in principle, actually vras not will-
ing to admit the exclusion of the Royal Navy.
8. I ev7 York Times
.
I' ovember 8, 1945, p.2
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On December 6, 1945, the Turkish government ansv/ered the
American note, accepting it as the basis for any discussion of
revision. No word had been received from the Soviet Union since
the Turkish government had refused to consider Soviet demands
in August!
The United States battleship I.Iissouri paid a courtesy vi-
sit to Istanbul when it brought home the Turkish envoy in April,
1946. This visit is thought to have been made chiefly to shov7
the Soviet Union our serious intent to protect the integrity of
Turkey and other parts of the Ivliddle East. The U.S.S.R. made
no more demands on the Straits until August, 1946, and the cente
of interest shifted from the Straits to the Transcausian fron-
tier of Turkey and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the anti-Turkish
campaign, which had been going on in the Soviet press and on the
radio since i/Iarch of 1945, continued in full force, including a
particularly violent attack on the Turkish elections in July.
On Aiogust 7, 1946, the next to the last day on which a
signatory of the Hontreux Convention could demand a revision of
it, the Soviet Union sent a note to Turkey; copies were also
sent to London and Washington. It complained, first, that "even
during the v;ar showed clearly that the regime off the Black Sea
Str-^its established by the Montreux in 1956 does not correspond
to the interests of security of the Black Sea povjers and does
not safegixard conditions that v;ould prevent the use of these
Straits for hostile. ends against the Powers. ” ^^^he first three
ts
9. New York Times, Au|gust 14, 1946, p.6
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Soviet suggestions v;ere similar to the American ones, which
could hardly have been more liberal to Soviet aims without
giving control directly^ to the Soviet Union. The fourth proposal
was that "the establishment of the regime of the Straits as the
only seaway leading from the Black Sea and into the Black Sea
( 10 )
must be decided by the Tui’ks and the other Black Sea pov/ers."
The fifth proposal went even further in pointing out that "Tut-
key and the Soviet Union, as the most interested povrers, must
organise jointly the defence of the Straits for the prevention
of their use by other powers with inimical aims to the Black
( 11 )
Sea pov/ers." The Soviet Unior^ then, had abandoned her direct
demand for bases on the Straits and tried to gain her objective
by close collaboration v/ith and, she no doubt hoped, a virtual
protectorate over her friend, Turkey. Her demands v/ould prevent
international regulation and v/ould not even permit the non-Black
Sea pov/ers to take part in revision conferences.
As might be e:q,'ectod, the Soviet note created a tense sit-
uation. The Turkish Foreign Minister reminded the world of the
British-Turkifeh alliance of 1939, vdiich Was "still the foundation
( 12 )
of Ankara’s foreign policy." He said that he vras agreeable
to far-reaching revisions of the Straits regime, but "v/ould
leave no stone unturned to prevent limitations of her jealously
(13)
iefended sovereignty." It v/as pointed out that one million men
or one-eighth of the ^nale population of Turkey was in uniform,
L6 . liOC # c it . 11. Loc
. c it
.
L2. Fisher, op. cit
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p. 271 13, Loc. cit
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that there was no prospect of demohilization or doing away v;ith
the state of siege or martial 18mt v/hich prevailed in the eas-
tern provinces and to a limited extent in Istanbul and areas
of the Dardanelles and ''/hrace
,
and that the array would fi^t
to maintain its sovereignty. The Turkish Minster told the Tur-
kish National Assembly that "no independence, sovereignty, or
territorial integrity was left in the small Baltic states a few
( 1^:)
months after the Russians obtained bases in those countries,"
The people of Turkey were in complete agreement vmth their gov-
ernment even though basically cooperation vrith the Soviet Union
vras favored; on August 14, the National Assembly upheld the pre-
sent administration in spite of its failure to obtain a friend-
ship pact vrith Russia. The People’s Party (the government par-
ty) and the Democratic party Joined in affirming that Turkey
would fight before she would yield any territory.
The other powers concerned v;ere hardly less upset by the
new Soviet note. In London, "the form of the Russian demand foi'
a new Dardanelles regime (w^s) regarded. . .as little less than
(15)
a diplomatic atom bomb." London interpreted the demands to
mean that the Soviet government v/as not willing to accept the
idea of revision of the Montreux Convention by its signatories,
minus Japan and plus the United States, but that the Soviet
Union intended to settle the v^hole question with Turkey bilaters
Britain ffelt that the procedure of revision as laid dov^n in the
T^, New York Times
.
August 15, 1946, p.3
15. Nevj York Times
. August 14, 1946, p.6
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Montre-ux Convention must be adhered to; the British government
would certainly back Turkish opposition to territorial concess-
ions. Britain v;as aware of her o\m somewhat similar position
in regard to the Suez Canal and said she would try to find some
sort of compromise that would satisfy Soviet security claims.
In the United States, one editorial v/riter said:
’’peopleewhose job it is to study Soviet Foreign policy
and to follovi closely the development of tension betwe-
en Russia and the U'est are far more worried about the
issues raised by 3;Ioscov/’s latest move in Turkey than
they are by verbal clashes at the Paris Peace Confer-
ence. There is a definite feeling that if the Russians
press their demands for a new Dardanelles statute along
the lines of their latest note to Ankara, and especially
if they attempt to force their views on the Turkish
government, then Turkey might well become the Poland
of the next war. Cr...she might... play the role of
Czechoslovakia. That is, if the Turksih government
does not feel itself strongly baeked not only diplo-
matically but if necessary, militarily by Britain and
the United States, then the Turks, like the Czechs in
the face of Hitler’s ’nerve war’ might give in. But
if so, it v;ould only be the prelude to conflict at
Soviet Russia’s next security demand, as Czech’s loss
was followed by Poland’s resistance and by the out-
break of the v/ar.” (16)
ether and more official attitudes toward the Soviet note may not
have been as drastic as this v/riter’s, but it is certain that
the general feeling was one of alarm and pessimism.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, v/as equally convinced
of the rightness of its demands* The Soviets interpreted the
agreement at Potsdam to mean that each pov/er":confer separately
with Turkey about the Straits as authorization to go ahead and
negotiate directly and bilaterally. Britain and the United
16. New^ York Times
, August 18, 1946, IV, p.5
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States understood that direct negotiation should be the next st^
toward a .conference at which the proposed amendnent would be
discussed, not as the final step settling the regime of the
Straits. The Soviet Union, however, was suspicious of Turkish
intentions, and v/as determined to gain the security she needed,
"The vital interests" of the Black Sea states, said a Pravda
article, "demands’' a cessation of this outside interference and
the "prohibition" of naval forces of other powers from the Blaclj
(17)
Sea. Her attacks on Turkey continuedl two or three days afteij
the publication of the note to Turkey, the Soviet Union broadcas|l
to the world documents said to have been found by the Red Amny
in the Reich tending to show that the Turkish government v/as
conniving v;ith the Naizs during the war and was strongly anti-
Soviet.
However, in the tv/o or three v;eeks before the American notllE
to the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union changed her tactics slight|jLy;
the government-controlled sources began to me.ke accusations
against the United States and Britain for obstructing peace
efforts and preparing for a new vrar. She commented favorably
on British troops in Basra and the sending of British and Indian
troops into Abadan. Attthe same time, her broadcasts on the
Straits question v/ere distinctly conciliatory and failed to
emphasize a bilateral settlement or smention her former demand
for bases. In London and 'Washington, it v:as suspected that the
Soviet Union v;as "using radio as a big stick.
.
.v;hile hinting at
17. Nev7 York Times
.
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(18)
herieadiness to settle the Dardanelles issue by revision.” The
trend v/as tov/ard "less menace and more propaganda to steady her
ovni position;” her radio attacks on Turkey vrere somewhat muted
(19)
for the time being.
The American government sent its official answer to the
Soviet government stating its exact attitude tov/ard Soviet de-
mands. First, Turkey should continue to shoulder the primary
responsibility tov^ard the Straits; the Russian proposal to share
control of the Dardanelles v/ith Turkey ignored the existence of
the U.N.O. If the Straits were attacked, the situation v;ould
clearly be a threat to international scurity and be the cause
for action by the U.N. Security Council. Therefore, it v/as not
necessary for the Soviet Union to share control with Turkey for
the proper protection of her security. The Soviet suggestion
was not a plan for revision but an entirely nev; Straits regime.
"The position of the Government of the United States is that the
regime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate rela-
tionship v.dth the U.N. and should function in a manner entirely
(20)
consistent with the prineiples and aims of the U.N.” A State
Department official said that "Russian insistence on her positio
(2
would be regarded as a grave matter with serious potentialities.
He further interpreted the "Russian scheme as having broader
implications than the mere desire for land defenses along the
13. New York Times. Auf;ust 20. 1946, p.6 19. Loc. cit.
20. New York Times.August 22. 1946. p.3
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gateway to the Black Sea.,, more plausible motive in Turkey^s




This vrholehearted support of Turkey’s right to control the
Straits v;as greeted v^th enthusiaism in Turkey. Turkish sources
reported that there had been little doubt of Britain’s support,
but there had been some question as to how far the United States
v/ould go. A Turkish spokesman stated "intervention by America
in this question removes Russian threat from Turkey. Vie accept
with our eyes shut all that America proposes. Vie have complete
(23)
confidence in the United States and her political concepts,"
The Soviet reaction to the American note vras as might have been
expected. The Daily Vforker, a Communist organ, reported: "The
State Department continued its ’big stick' campaign against the
European democracies and the Soviet Union yesterday with a blunt
note rejecting proposals for joint Russo-Turkish control of the
Dardanelles .. .the State Department v.^s clearly engaged in a big
attempt to pressure Europe, to show off its strength at Paris
(24)
and panic the American into a v;ar fever."
The Turkish stand was further strengthened by the British
note to the Soviet Union
,
sent on August 21. The general prin-
ciples were same as those stated in the American note, and the
wording of the note was even firmer than that of the American
one. "It has for long been internationally recognized that the
22, Loc, cit. 23. Nev7 York Times
.
August 23,1946,p.i>
24. Ne\^^ York Times
. August 23, 1946, p.3
?,01

















arf-t Xo-rj^no^) o>*t cfrf'c'X’t rfToqqr/e XaiT:fc.'ir>ffeIoifw aiiiy* Iv
i'iO*nxoa fl<U;{'ufT . irl jt£;iele;j.r(itro licftv' £>9^00:13 s '•’•' 'j
^
+n:o4 gx'.:j a 'in rKcr'.f)' oXo'-gXI neoJ i)fin 9Tonif cTiirfa Xod"ioqo^irv ',. V"
'•
.'•
' If ' • •
•joX-ci- £)9vin^' BfTtt '[!»* wor: oj- an noigsejj.o -.roB rtBScf Jb££i oi9i{q -
* ^
i BoX'Xori.''. yf aoXv^aoya:“:‘-nj:” rt'-rfseri J',-' nni'^iLfT X .o*^ X)IjjbT^J‘
I
ci'qeoc.G o' .reX'ujX :20'i*l' nsiaar/H aev'^r'a f froid-pBij,' Exriw‘^i:|'-
. « I
('




















©rf' ”’ : ' utToq « inBio-io w a/ra/iurow r .^rfioW xlifzfl or ,f>&go
©'^t go'Tt-;—^ n.- r er^ r-r ’Xcxia m'X £)'>wrti:Xxioo J“i:5Hng*xiwT0CL ©gacfciS;.--
'.cfnjjld '. rld-i-- noxnU d-©xvo • ©rfg bfis Gexofrroor©/’ nuero'^f'St
\
,1
Bdi “io Ir)'is<no© x'e.cX- --^^grrH ini /f tro*t aXa^oq^'^f' -c j ny ©j-orr|
I
' i
j -wj-ff ak vX : -©ic Inon^X'X^-qfiU. d^bI’S b.- ... .iXI©njcb*:Bu j
'* ©iiT' * if, '^c'^noi’T .. Btfi *^’lo V :'-fg oct , '-TO-xiiX ©'m eaTc o*' oqr'©gjr.
(^.i
,
I ”.y \*o*^ y.y' n' o^nX /TBiuxiefli. 9rI 4’ oxnsq
fLaJ-gry enr yi 'beiieifl-r^nagie aoci'in'i a.s^v Xa^J-n xfsx:>iuT ©r{T
-niT'i XB'ion©*'; SiV~ . X£0 InsE , xioi.i J vtoiv*?-' v '. X 01onj
oxfl- X: .n^on fi£r.jr-:w;i.. ©rl^ a'x J&O06X8 oanril a;- eraa oiov: B.i.xioJ
nrioryei'a, odd’ to I’sril ni3rf* 'ic^r-TJ: t novo rbw odoa odd to a.rrxo'io--^
. ©fW 5e^:ifnoofi*r yXXirnoiiBiiiBuiii no© f t^coX ict Qxxf d-I” . anor
,dir , 0P
,a^t?x dauy,!^ z^-r.pX ,?4 I
' **
104
regime of the Straits is the concern of other states hesides
the Black Sea powers. His llajesty’s government cannot-^ there-
fore, agree with the Soviet view that the future regime should
(25)
he the concern of the Black Sea powers alone.” The Turks
V7ere relieved hy these tv;o notes for they felt that the pro-
blem v/as no longer merely a Turkish one, but had become a Bri-
tish and American concern as well.
Britain, too, v/as cheered by the firm American stand; "th|^
United States, assuming the historic role of British diplomacy,
has taken the lead in opposing the Russian demand for control
(26)
of the Straits," London reported. There v/as"a grov/ing con-
viction in London that the United States intervention may prove
decisive not only in the important issues of the Dardanelles an
Trieste, but also on the basic problem of relations with the
(27)
I
Soviet Union." The Dardanelles note and the ultimatum to Tit
demanding redress and satisfaction over the capture and killing
of the American airmen were "regarded in Britain as introducing
a nev/ element in the diulomatic situation just when and where
(28]
it was most needed."
On August 22, confident in British-American support, Tur-
key sent a long note in answer to the Soviet proposals. She de-
fended herself from Soviet accusations of negligence and parti-
san treatment of the Axis in her regime of the Straits during
the war. Turkey maintained that "not a single time during
New York Times
. November 22, 1946, p.l4
Nev/ York Times
. August 25, 1946, IV, p.5
• Loc. cit. 28. Loc« cit.
'ro rtTOoaoo orf^ qL n^txBid-S ox.^d- "io e: ?
* \
-9'if)rid’ crt9CTfri9vo'3 3 ’ slti .stiov/oq roi- ?foBl arid”
IjXxrorfn oxTl-^ao: aTurcfi;^ sd^ ctf.rfd- 'velv &e£vob arfd- lid-lv^ oo'i^b *8101 j-
(e::)




-o-iq-ajid- d-^rij vtla*!: 'xo*): aad-o.i ov;d- vcf-* Xiovaji^a'i 0 '-.av.’ ';
ii
-rrtJ £t oujr'^pd i: sd dr/f) , '^fio rfaX>:r:'rT £- YXo^ar; rraYnoI on utalcf ,j







i^ii "’ : or* itcfy, nroZTJr^A rrJl od.f vd bQvceodo bp’' .cod’ |j
\ \
. voBTi'-'It^'^b x^exdi'x'I lo oZo*! ol-rojain odo ".nltrjrs^*^ ^aad-pd-t bad'XnU
I'
"• TdfTCxO 'roZ bdPi.iob nBX3Qi;H or^d '"-'.nxaouao ni arid’ fior'bv'- exff
(as)
^








Ij.tp r:alj ane/rrj:!! ar{? to 3 <^ ftnod-it r.t oflo fti: vitro d-nn aviaxoab 1
I,
ajit rid’'” axini^BXo'f 'o noIcT'**^ olcoc" ©ffd" no oaXx dud ^aJsaxxT [I
(VS)





bno’ o'lud^ o pdd 10-70 itoido;^tQi;d/^3 h x sooioai
;






oi^a- fp^ ji->Kv; noidri/tXa oi-’ rroXxxX orfa ni d-nocioXo won a
(-•
) ;
.‘boon d’ao.'i; 3n.v &t 1 ,
- 11 ; ' ,dioq\’;f 3 nx.oi-'t -lieidii'i nl &nobi :aioo , ' i .ur/o- xiO
I
- 3fl. . . X -jacrro-j " daxvn- eifd ocr lO'vanjb* ai. oJo/x.?>ioX a ditor,
,
/
,,-Xd-r'Cf.ftr.- oo.’iani I. ‘'ca «xioxvt/'-:f^o:') j dsJrod r'-xt '^Xaoian ^ofnat .
,
r
f j?iixinf) cdxxx.tM o£::i to anii-^oi lo/i xtt exx:^. ilx to diioi. *'i- iJ nee ^
r






World V/ar II did the Soviet Government catch the Turkish Republi
3
with a situation that v/ould put the security of the Black Sea in
(29)
danger." She stated that she had alv/ays applied the stipula-
tions of the Montreux Convention conscientiously, and that any
fault v/as due to some of the admittedly obsolete technical parts
of the Convention, but "it (could not) admit that these faults,
condemned to remain isolated cases, should serve as motives for
the rejection in its v/hole of a convention that reveals itself
(30)
an instrument of equilibrium." Moreover, to suggest changing
the present form of defense of the Straits v;ould be "to deny the
existence and aims of the U.N. Charter" and to. show the U.N. a
(31)
distrust which the Turkish government did not "undprstand. " If
the Soviet Union feared aggression, it could "refer to the effi^
(32::)
cacy of the U.N.
,
to which Turkey remain(ed) firmly attached."
"The most sure guarantee for security of the Soviet Union in the
Black Sea resides not in the search of a privileged strategical
position in the Straits—a position incompatible v/ith the dignity
and sovereign rights of an independent country—but in the re-
storation of friendly, trusting relations with a strong Turkey
which is decided to use all her forces to inaugurate this happy
era, but whose efforts in this cause need to be seconded by an
(33)
equal good-will coming from its northern neighbor," Turkey
wanted to be certain that in any conference of the future one Of
her main supporters would be present so she stated that "as for
New York Times
. August 25, 1946, p.l2 30. Loc, cit
.
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participation of the United States in the proposed conference,
the Turkish government considers this not only as a realization
(34)
of a v;arra hope, but also as an imperative necessity."
The attitude of the Turkish government to any Russian
attempts to absorb Turkey in her orbit had been made clear to
the Soviet Union, and, there \ms nothing hidden about the sup-
port of America and Britain in this view. As Time so aptly put
it, "sinking back on their time;lyopolitical cushion, (the Turks]
pulled on their hookahs and gazed Moscowards with an expression
(35)
that plainly said: ’Your move.’" Boreshadowing did appear in a
Turkish nev/spaper: "rejecting the Russian proposals is insuff in-
dent • * The Soviet Union must be told to v^ithdraw from every-
where it has entered vmthout right. Our answer v/on’t satisfy
Russia for Moscow hates the international regime, which vre are
(36)
ready to improve on,nif necessary."
For a month, the Soviet Union sent no official notes con-
cerning the Straits; she v/as momentarily silenced. Her radio
propaganda continued as usual, against Britain particularly. The
Soviet press charged that Britain had set up military installat-
ions in the Dardanelles area, and even v/orse, "according to re-
ports available in Beirut, the British qiilitary adviser and in-
structor at a radar station stated that he would resign unless
he v/as placed directly in charge of the station. The Turks
complied with his demand and appointed him chief of the station,
34. Loc. cit. 35. Time
,
vol.48, September E, 1946, p.22
36. New York Times
. August 26, 1946, p.l
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v/ith a Turkish officer attached to him as an assistant." In
answer to the first accusation, the British replied that perhaps
thet referred to radar which they "presumed' our troops in Greece
(38)
are using as most armies do." Further accusations were called
"provocative fabrications;" "v;e have established no supply base,
nor have we taken over any airfields, although we have supplied
the Turkish with radar equipment. \'Je have also sent oVer tech-
nicians to demonstrate the workings of the apparatus. But we
(39)
have done so with several other countries."
On September S4, another Soviet note v/as handed to the
Turkish Foreign Minster replying to the earlier Turkish note.
It contained a v;arning to Turkev that if she began organizing
"military measures in the Straits together with any non-Black
Sea pov/er," it v;ould be considered by the Soviet Union as "con-
tradicting directly" the interests of security of the other B]ac
(40)
Sea states. The Soviet Union complained that the Turkish gov-
ernment turned dovm"whole -sale" all possibilities of studying
the problem with the Soviet government, that such an attitude
"clearly contradicts" Turkish protestations of friendship toward
Russia, and that the Turkish assertion that joint defense of the
Straits is incompatible \?ith Turkish sovereignty is an entirely





37. Loc, cit. 38. Loc. cit.
39. Nev/ York Times. Aueust 27. 194.6. n.S
40. New York Times: Sentfimbfi-r
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N Nor v/as the Soviet governnent satisfied v/ith Turkish ex-
planations of minor violations of the Montreux Convention; thes
3
explanations, said the Soviet note, do not ’’release the Turkish
government from the resnonsihility it hears for the violation
of control of the Straits that took place during the vrar."
Moreover, Turkish reference to the steps Turkey had taken at
British insistence in 1944 ’’only confirms the justice of the
Soviet statement that the Montreux Convention had not prevented
the Straits from being used by enemy povjers against the A^llies
(43)
JBtates.” Turkey’s attention v.^s also dravTi to the Black
Sea’s being a ’’closedsea”, therefore making the function>- of the
Dardanelles ’’entirely different" from those of the Straits of
(44)
Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. In this case, "it v/ould be
just to establish a regime in the Straits that v/ould above all,
correspond to the special situation and the security of Turkey,
(45)
the U.S.S.R, and other Black Sea pov/ers." Also, said the
Soviet note firmly, this proposal "by no means" contradicts the
interests of other nations in strengthening universal peace
and the security of nations; the Soviet government "holds the
opinion that it is only b^' mutual means that Turkey and the
Soviet Union can guarantee the freedom of commercial navigation
(46)
and the security of the Straits." Joint defense of the Strain s
42, Loc . cit
.
^5. Loc, cit
. 44. Loc , cit . -- a"closed sea’
as opposed to an "open sea" is, in international lav;, a land-lo-
cked or nearly land-locked sea, and presents no question of
right of passage by a third state—C . Femvick, International La\'-.
p.295.
45. Loc, cit .
46. Loc, cit
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would safeguard them to a greater degree than an exclusively
Turkish defense.
The second note came as a surprise since all concerned
thought their last notes sufficiently positive to stop any fur-
ther demands of the same nature. However, the Soviet Union did
not send this note to Britain and the United States as she had
her first one, and had thus prejudiced "in advance their right
(47)
to participate in the talks for the revision of the treaties."
Turkey, however, because she considered the tv/o powers properly
a party to any such negotiations kept them informed. Vfithin
Turkey itself, moderate political circles considered the Soviet
note a mild one and a possible basis for future bargaining and
discussions. The more general attitude was expressed in the
newspaper Ulus ; "it really is incomprehensible that Russia shoul
take offense because we do not V7ant to cede bases or our terri-
tory...We hope our new answer will make it understood that this
d
(43)
subject cannot become the theme of an exchange of correspondence.
The Turkish press published its usual reports of Russia’s forti-
fying her Black Sea areas and planning to attack Turkey at any
moment; although the Turkish army v;as not actually "alert", it
V7as prepared for any emergency.
The United States v/as also displeased by the new Soviet
proposals; on September 31, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal
issued a formal statement, undoubtedly aimed at the Soviet Union,
rr
47. New York Times
,
August 18, 1946, p.lO
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that units of the United States Navy v;ere then in the Mediterra-
nean and would remain there to support the Allied occupation po-
licy in Europe and "to protect United States’ interests and
(49)
United States’ policies in the area." On the same afternoon,
a State Department statement was made which did not have the
precision of I'oreestal’s hut did indicate tha.t we had a definite
interests in conditions in the Mediterranean. However, tv.^o days
later. Dean Acheson tried to calm public opinion by saying that
he sav; nothing unusual in their being American forces in the
Mediterranean to support American foreign policy, and that there
(50)
was a "lot of unnecessary excitement." The Secretary of State
v^as not quite so unconcerned: "it v/ould be folly to deny the
seriousness of the conflict in viev/points among the Allies,,,!
concur most heartily in the viev/ recently expressed by Generali-
ssimo Stalin that there is no immediate danger of war.., The di-
fficulty is that, v.hile no nation ^vants v?ar, nations may pursue
(51)
policies or courses of action \7hich lead to vrar."
On October 9, both the British and American governments
sent sharp notes to the Soviet government. Said the British
note; "the Potsdam Agreement laid it dov.Ti as the next step this
matter should be the subject of direct conversations betv/een
each of the three governments and the Turkish government. But
it is the viev7 of my government ths.t this ’next step’ has been
completed by the Exchange of views v/hich have nov7 taken place
49. New York Times
.
October 6, 1946, p,5, IV
50. revf York Times
, October B, 1946, p.l4
51. New York Times
. October 6, 1946, IV, p.l
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betv/een these governments. Hy governments therefore see no nee I
( 52 )
for or purpose in continuing direct correspondence on the suhjept.”
However, Britain was still ready for a conference of a sort
follov^ing the provisions of^ the Montreux Convention.
The United “States note reiterated its viev/s of August 19;
copies were sent to France, Greece, Rumania, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and Yugoslavia. It v/as, of course, hoped that the not'^
would serve as a preventive measure before the Soviet Union pre-
cipitated any positive action tov/ard gaining control of the
Straits. Potsdam, it stated, should not ’’have the effect of
prejudicing the participation of the other tv;o signatory pov/ers
in the revision”of the Montreux Convention; diplomatic corres-
pondence should merely be ”a useful preliminary to a conference
(53)
of all of the interested powers.” Finally, the American gov-
ernment stated that it felt ”it v/ould be lacking in frankness
if it should fail to point out again this time, in the most
friendly spirit
,
that in its opinion the government of Turkey
should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of
the Straits and that should the Straits become the object of at-|
tavk by an aggressor, the resulting situation would be a matter
(54t
for action on the part of the Security Council of the U.N.”
The Turkish government was glad to see that her backers
were still supporting her. The only doubt about the American
note seemed to be whether action by the U.N. Security Council
52. Nev; York TimesT'November 22, 1946, p,14
53. Nevr York Times
.
October 12, 1946, p.3
54. Loc . cit.
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in case of aggression would "be fast and efficient enough. On
October 18, the Turks ansv/ered the Soviet note, in v;ords making
it clear that, as far as it was concerned, all preliminary dis-
cussions concerning the Dardanelles had been completed. It re-
torted on the supposed threat to Soviet security during the war
that the "real threat to the security of the Black Sea shores
came from the occupation of a large part of the shore of that
sea by the German armies, from the German; possession of the Ru-
manian and Bulgarian fleets and from the presence of German and
Italian ships sent to the Black Sea ports by rail or through the
(55)
Danube," As to cooperation among the Black Sea pov/ers, Turkey
said it had "a clear perception of her quality as a Black Sea
po’ver, but she (could not) forget that she is a Ivlediterranean
country, too. Having a particularly sensitive geographic situ-
ation in assuring liaison between the tvro vrorlds separated by th
restricted space of the Straits, she is conscious of the obliga-
tions v/hich this situation imposes upon her in regard to the two
seas which wash her shores.., The Turkish government (could not)
therefore, consider the question of the Black Sea and the Strait,
(56)
as a problem interesting only Black Sea pov/ers."
In answer to the Soviet warning about outside help, Turkey
stated that "the very definite attitude which the Turkish govern^
:aent ahs taken on the matter is not a gamble on any hypothetical
foreign support
. .Turkey feels herself strong and united and coul(
i
!
55, New York Times, October 21. 1946, p.l5 56. Loc. cit.
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not compromise on the issue, . .Acceptance of these proposals woul I
force Turkey into a regional and exclusive uolicy for which the
(57)
Turkish government has no taste." Moreover, it fe.lt that Rus-
sian concern v;as "strategically outdated by modern weapons. No
fleet vrauld risk being bombed in the confined channel provided
(58)
by the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus." Finally, the Turkish
government declared itself ready, "while maintaining its definite
attitude concerning points 4 and 5 in the Russian demands," to
attend a conference comprised of the signatory pov;ers of the Mon
-
treux Convention v/ithout Japan and with the United States pre-
(59)
sent. "The v^ork of preliminary preparations desired at Potsdam
is virtually completed, thanks to communications ra9.de by the Uni*
ted States and Britain, to Ankara first, and then by an exchange
(60)
of notes concerning the same subject vjith Soviet Russia,"
The Soviet Union v/as disappointed and bitter about the
failure of her second note to entice Turkey into closer collabor •
ation v;ith its government. The Soviet press felt that the Tur-
kish reply ^vas the result of "extremely crooked, secret negotia-
tions betv/een Turkish and American diplomats," that the "intriguj"
v;as a "crying contradiction" to the "pathetic statements of the
Turkish press that Turkey is fully independent and deciding her
ovm policy. L' .We have heard about dollar diplomacy and of dollar
diplomacy, but hasn’t the
’
geography of the dollar’ now appeared
tei)
on God’s earth with a new distribution of land and sea."
58 , Loc. cit
•
57. Loc. citr
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In a speech to the United Nations in late October, the
Turkish representative, although not mentioning the Straits spe-
cifically, defied the Soviet Union on the issue in a veiled
way: "army and military might are pov7erful vreapons, hut the
(62)
force of v/orld opinion is far more potent." He then added
his wish that the field of application for the veto power he,
if not eliminated, at least limited. Turkey, fearing Soviet
intentions, v;as putting her complete trust in the United Nations.
In November, the issue v/as closed for the time being by
the Soviet answer to the British note of October 9. It was
understood to have offered little hope that any conference
would be held soon, and that, even if it were, any agreement
satisfactory to the Soviet Union could be reached.
Since the Soviet note, there has been no formal mention
of the Dardanelles, but each side has obviously become more
determined. The "Triman doctrine" of the spring of 1947, by
which the United States threatens to back up its •moral sup-
port of Turkey v/ith financial aid, has made it clear to the
Soviet Union that the United States is not bluffing and v/ill
not draw back into Its isolationist shell if threatened. On
the other hand, the Soviet Union has not forgotten her aims;
the problem is still unsolved.
62. New York Times
.
October 27, 1946, p,l
; *c.
9rf^ ,'rpdo"oC Ov“^c;X n/ PCioi^K^l fjr.ttiiU 9f(cf o;^ rCo& ^qa b xI
-v^qs edt T^rfifiox*rft». tprt rf^c.i.tXje ,ovi,’J ir.tr.92 e'lgo't ff3i:.‘'ic3'
^t)Xi!.)V ,? fix oufiPi 9X1:1 ICO loXur tri.voo erfd fteXloh ,',:IIr:c>i‘xfo
adJ-
,
eiToqirev/ eTL' •'riC‘*‘iXiin bas Tfur’r?” v
'V.








,cri9XVOc.i ^vaVTir'^ . ^stXnixJ Js-^ral , bo.:' in119 ton 11
?
cltrr.'ljjoH talixT eriJ ni tex/Tt -srTiTtnn axr// , ^aioUr. icir.i
I- •
^
YcT.^nidd oiiLtt 9a j 'ro4 1^ 'olw aa*;; ©x/BC.i ^r-t ^'jociravo; nl
** *
i/ivr -tZ ^OiS^joC l 9 •ttr. ii'lriv' ajt ox in-vcns tuivoc Pfr-
©ofi9'ro‘ifioo yn tftit' pqorf oX tiX fto'io'jxo ov.^xl ot JbootP'^'Ojjni*'
.V':r'r: 99'x:a 3 Yfi
,
OY r.'.' tl 11 '^.o'^ Jtiiia ^ 1 £t<i^ O'J bXiXov/
$
'
. a: 9 .,f i..I:rro nr jnd telvcfc en:^ or! x+oBlcitac
rfoltn^rj Xriatol r>n' .r:-»o f a .f c'^orit , 9.tQii t&lvoS oii& BonJ'.h
erc!»' daiocvd 'ir-:; 9 J5xc dcx^ tjxd , r.fjlisnijb'xau r>.i;^ ':o
Tjr,^ ^V^0.C '^'v' ^rT’*t?^v' lo '’ 9 .1 ': ’’toob [ir.:\ i" '' sAl tot H
-rr -;2 Xi^Y-Ot. ^ / oj snotBO'isi^: 9f>tsa::. batlfrU orft
ofit ot Ti- ;.I-- •'1 oj'aa:: .-.r . ix Iflionaxtll dAsv.' lo t'\oi
XXI’*'* bitB ;^xillx'fXcJ tOii si 9if.r trri.t uolii-. tax .Cu
!,
V t
It ,'iAii 'Crsol.l xi Xl^tl? 5l :o *:l‘.-XosI otxii Moad n. tx>' tort ,1
ar rtojto^v^cl toa -’.rr' no.tnU ..*-oJ:voti o.* , oncri ton.',
,/>©7losfJCii 1X1 te al ittoX juiq 9.x 1
X







Today everyone agrees that the Montrenx Convention is in
need of revision. The League of Nations has disappeared, and
Japan should be released from any responsibility as a signatory
pov/er. It is obsolete in that there are no provisions for smal]
vessels under 100 tons ranking up a large numerical proportion
of a modern fleet, in that no account is taken of the possibilitf;
of effective closure by sea and air of the approaches to the
Straits, and that the political situation in the eastern Medi-
terranean and the Black Sea is different from vrhat it vras in
1956.
The problem of the Straits is basically the same today as
it v/as in 1936, although the specific points of disagreement are
of a different nature. In 1936, Britain, opposing the Soviet
Union as Britain and the United States are nov/, did not. \mnt
non-Black Sea vrarships excluded from the Straits or even limited
in number. In 1946, the 'Testern powers are willing to grant
that limitation of the -number of non-Black Sea v’arships, coupled
v;ith practically free passage of the vrairships of Black Sea po-
wers, is a fair adjustment. Hov;ever, the Soviet Union is no
longer satisfied with this concession; she wants positive assur-
ance that she v;ill have control of the Straits in v/artime by
having bases herself in the Straits zone and by sharing control
with Turkey.
Obviously, the United States and Great Britain v/ill oppose
such demands, perhaps even to the point of v/ar. Already, the
;
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United States is threatening to pnt money hehind its diplomatic
cooperation v/ith Turkey in an attempt to assure Turkey^,s holding
to our democratic point of viev; and to v/arn the Soviet Union
against forcing her demands on Turkey hy diplomatic or military
pressure. The satisfaction of Soviet aims would result in Tux-
key’s becoming a Soviet satellite, they feel; according to the
American and British viev', this situation vrauld be contrary to
all the post-war ideals the Soviet Union had agreed to, inclu-
ding the principles of the United Nations Charter. Turkey’s
sovereignty must be maintained in spite of Soviet desires for
security, and the United States and Britain fail to see why the
United Nations and related separate agreements cannot satisfy
the Soviet Union. As Bevin said, on Tune 4, 1946, in the House
of Commons: ”vre will alv/ays welcome the mercantile fleet of the
Soviet Union on all the seas of the vrorld...v7e will sail to Od-
essa again, to the Black Sea and Constanza, quite freely, but
v;e do not ask for a base or military requirements to ensb le us
to do so... our aim is the free movement of shipping and the
v/orld's trade .. .v/hatever responsibilities we undertake in the
defence scheme of the v/orld in any particular area, we give a
solemn undertaking that they v/ill be on a basis of freedom to
( 1 )
all members of the Peace Club on equal terms."
The Soviet Union bases her right to control the Straits
on a more fundamental justice than that of preservation of the
status quo
,
she thinks* According to the Soviet Union, her uosi-
1. Harry N.Hov/ard,"Some Recent Developments the
~ of the 'TuhkiSh Straits; 194b-46 .
’
’Dept
. of State Bui , vor.:^^!'
No. 395, January 26, 1947, p.l46
8Cl-l Y3.ro/ o& ^fffiojso'idcr al aic^JRJcJ fiod-iiiU
i|
5 -j.r.io.: oi/rp.os • cfq£ai?^^3 sw nl y©""X7T noiiJ-^ia.Tooo
i|
ct^ivoo arfi m:ov; oc]- fcto v;eiv 'Xo fnloq ot&^'iooii-^b u/o o/t
i




,-TiL;'i' ni --^Iva^z bJjsov a/z-b:- ctelroo to fioidoctaiJ'i&ii oiiT .3*ii;3r .-r ii
©dt o.:f ^xI)TOor« ;Xoot , oo'i C iot.^a doxvoci £ -^xiir^ooe-d a'^ozi
!t
o.t YTOTtnoo ocf Xl£'QV.‘ noicVr/d ta sl/U ,’*-eiv doXJXTrT ba; t.zoxto^i.h f
ntrlo:.!: ,Ovt X0aT?>3 !);./{ noinU teivO'.- ©n'^ 2lx»ooJt T3v/-j-soq ©ift iix I'
?’-"0bTi/' .TvdTGif . axxoidB;! ©dc; to aalqionl'^ osiJ- i
Tct a rr.iseb &Bt'xo'cz to odlcrp rri. bo£iX-./?xrnxx.'.: o f jairr Y^V-xoiovop
silkt Yxl'.* osa ocT Jx VI aJt^d'l'i^ Jbrtx a^d^vta ood-' x'u ©/{/J” bnn
,
Ytei/tae donrrro au/:©Y;©eT,^B ©dx-.c.'^ ;©!’ XoxmIot £>ffs arroXcfij'd X 3 >.'’Xtu
o'iT/o:. GJlc! fii ^0^91 ^rcifT* no .bJ->=^a ntv^' ' ."oXrf: ^ox/Oc 'ev.+





->:0 bd’ Ixfiz Hi"’ Q* , , , TC ori-’ tc aaaa od^ XXb to ^©ivoo il
3Tt SvX7:
,
?zaF:‘ofifj'> •^rtf'.xo'.; :{;j/r;XX ©dd
,
£ 22 ©
air sXdin© od a.biorTTXc/coT
-Y^^ tXXI. • TO .ep.x./ /• TOt be£ don ofi ©rv
.^i
9£fd f>fi£ ,-<irX'Tqiida to d/rcr.OTor ooTt odd ax :;.Xf- tito . . . . z ob <>
ofij nx oi(£d':9r»iii/ ©’" ne/.JxIXcfiarro.icoT Tovodjcri^',
. , jlixTV. © bXTor,
r 9vi3 ©*,’ <£©T..' Ti^UroI’dT'rcr ''xTj.i nl bXTov; ©da'-to ar.odoa aoaatel)
I
o/* xioJ&ojTt to ex^Td £ TO od IIxv/ ''Qi'j d-uiq 5nx:%£dT3im/ nn©Xoa
'
. TT©d ,Iex_"© f:c cfi/XO ©on©-: uri. to to amor: XXn
odlsTdd odd XoTdnoo od Tori a j .nd noXnU doXToS Qr.'T
- i
,




















‘ ox:. ,3G ,dQr .oVI i
118
tion as the large pov/er most in need of the free use of the St-
raits from the first consciousness of herself as a state, V7ith
obligations to increase her trade, protect her territory, and
build her prestige among other nations, has never been suffici-
ently recognized. Turkey, all historians agree, v/as allov/ed to
exist or rather forced to stay alive during the nineteenth cen-
tury only because Briatin and France and other interested pov/erd
needed her as a protection against Russian seizure of the Strai|s.
A Soviet nev/spaper raved the international conventions in the
past had been "wholly directed against Russia and served as a
( 2 )
policy for turning Turkey into a noose for strangling Russia,"
The V/estern powers have offered what they feel is adeouat^
security for the Soviet Union, internationalization of the Straits,
Neither the Soviet Union nor Turkey approves of such a change.
Soviet vrriters counter by saying that the Straits of Gibraltar,
the Suez and the Panama Canals should also be put under inter-
national control, nenry Vfallace ,in his notorious letter, point^
out: "most of us are firmly convinced of the soundness cf our
position vfhen we suggest the internationalization and deforti-
fication of the Danube and the Dardanelles, but we would be
horrified and angered by any Russian counter-proposal that woul^
involve also the internationalization and disarming of Suez or
Panama, We must recignize that to the Russians these seem to
(3)
be identical situations," Indignant American vrriters try to
2. New York Times
. August 25, 1946, 1:7
5, Nev; York Times. October 6, 1946, IV, 5:6
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show how different the Panama and the Dardanelles are; the Uni-
ted States built the Panama Canal to provide for quick passage
from one side to the other of the United States, v/hereas the
Dardanelles are a natural v/aterway not providing passagev/ay
from one part of the Soviet Union to the other; the United
States has Panamanian permission and also an agreement of long
standing, v;hile Turkey is fighting Soviet plans and the ^traits
have for many years been controlled through an international
convention; lastly, Turkey proved capable of defending the Strai
during a war v/hile Panama undoubtedly could not. Actually, the
Straits are just as valuable to the Soviet Union even if they
do not permit passage from one part of the country to another,
at least not directly, for they are the only hope of direct en-
trance for her ships into the Mediterranean; the United States
could go around South America or transport her goods by rail,
a more direct route, any.Tay. As for Panamanian permission, this
was gained in the last century through American intervention in
the Panamanian revolution against Colombia; Russia v/ould un-
doubtedly have had similar permission from Turkey long ago if
other pov/ers had not intervened. Finally, Turkey was not placed
in a position during the second World War where she actually had
to defend the Straits, and she obviously could not defend the
ts
Straits from a power like the Soviet Union unless other powers
helped her. Until other similar ’.’atei^'.^ays are put under inter-
national control, it is unlikely that the Soviet Union will
whoMieartedly agree to such a proposal.
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The attitude of the United States and Great Britain toivard
-rhat vjould amount to Soviet control of the Straits is merely a
slightly changed version of the '"estern pov/ers' feeling in the
nineteenth century. They do not "rant the Soviet Union to gain
i strong foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean, for in doing so
bhe Soviet Union might "outflank the strategic lines of defense
(4)
upon v/hich the British depend throughout the Middle East." Bri-
:ain wants her lifeline secure, and that excludes Soviet domin-
ation of the area. To protect that lifeline, the V/estern powers:
ire again ready to preserve Turkish sovereignty.
From a practical point of vievr, the solution to the prohlen
3f the Straits would be to grant the Soviet Union her bases and
political control of the Straits. As an English writer says, "in
bime of peace, the regime obtaining is of so little importance
:hat it may be questioned vjhether Turkey would be wise to insist
:oo strongly on the letter of her sovereignty and raise the issue
:o the level of a major international dispute... in time of war,
control of the Straits is clearly of vastly greater importance
:o Russia than to any other Pov/er, and in the event of a war be-
tween her and any Mediterranean pov;er it would seem that the zone
jould not escape becoming a battlefield v^hose control would go
to the strongest.
.
.and it is highly unlikely that Turkey could
(5)
'emain neutral in such a war."
A conference for revision of the Montreux Convention would
r; ”T\irkey : Rus s ian Sque e z e , " Nev^sv/eek , 28:36, August 26, 1946
). "Russia, Turkey and the Straits," The World Today, vol.ll,
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probably end in disagreement since each side is equally insis-
tent. However, if some political agreement can be reached in
regard to the whole area, actually unlikely, since the mtter
is so vital to the balance of power betvjeen the ""e stern p owers
and Russia, the problem of the Dardanelles might be solved by
voluntary giving in of one side or the other. No satisfactory,
at least permanently satisfactory, compromise seems possible
at the moment; the Soviet view is so completely different from
the Allied viev/ that there is no common stand to begin on. It
seems probable that, by war or political compromise, the Soviet
Union v/ill gain the control she v;ishes. The most promising vray
to prevent this is through a really strong United Nations, to
v/hich the nations of the world will be v/illing to give up part
of their sovereignty. When and if this happens, the Soviet Un-
ion will no longer suspect that the United Nations is merely an
Anglo-American bloc and will v/illingly entrust her security in
the Middle East to the United Nations Organization,
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The Straits of the J^ardanelles and the Bosphorus have, sinise
the beginning of history, been the cause of intense rivalries
because of their commercial and strategic value, as both the
passageway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and as
the link between Europe and Asia. From the time of the conquest
of Constantinople in 1453 until the 17th century, the Straits
were a Turkish lake, closed to outsiders. VJith the emergence
of Russia as a united nation in the 17th century came her first
consciousness of the value of the Straits to her. From then on,
the history of the Straits is a tale of Russian frustrations in
her desire to open the Straits for her warships , through wars
with Turkey or diplomatic pressure, by interested Western pov^ers
especially Great Britain.
Russia’s inaccessibility to her Allies during the World
(Var because of closure of the Straits made her more anxious than
ever to control them herself, '..'ith the grovrbh of nationalisn in
Turkey and the settlement of Russian internal problems, the hu-
miliating anfl unratified Treaty of Sevres v^as no longer a satis-
factory Straits regime, and the Lausanne Straits Convention was
dravm up. It provided for nearly complete freedom of passage
for warships in peacetime and wartime, with a limitation on ingrt ss
to mollify the Soviet Union, demilitarization of the Straits
zone, and the creation of an International Straits Commissicn
.
In the middle thirties, a series of treaty repudiations
and undeclared vra.rs coupled with the obvious ineffectiveness of
the League during crises, convinced Turkey that the remilitarizal ion
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of the Straits was necessary for her security. In June of 1936,
after a formal Turkish note requesting revision sent to the sig-
ners of the Lausanne Straits Convention, a conference made ip
of representatives of Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union,
Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Rumania, Jugoslavia, and Aus-
tralia met in Montreux, Sv;itzerland
,
using as a basis for dis-
cussion a draft dra\vn up b'?- the Turkish government. The final
convention was a compromise between this draft and a British
one; it was extremely favorable to both Turkey and the Soviet
Union. The Straits Commission was eliminated, and its powers
given to Turkey. Also, Turkey, when belligerent, could herself
decide whether to close the Straits to neutral v’arships . The
Soviet Union was given unlimited egress, except that vTarships
must pass singly, while strict limitations were made on the
passage of non-Black Sea warships. All the signatories were
v/ell-satisf ied, however, even Great Britain, which considered
the concessions it made compensated for by Turkish friendshjg).
During 'Vorld ^'"ar II, the Montreux Convention was generally
observed by both sides, not, however, from any moral sense but
merely circumstances of the v;ar, for until 1941, the active
part of the v/ar did not reach the Straits area. After that,
German military control was to great for the Allies to atteiipt
to seize the Straits. In spite of Turkey’s treaty of mutual
assistance with France and Great Britain, Turkey clung stubbornl
r
to her neutrality until the middle of 1944 vihen she stopped
certain German shipping at British insistence. It was not mtil
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after February 1945ttliat the Allies v/ere pemitted free use of
the Straits.
During the last stages of the v/ar, the Soviet Union laid
the pattern for her post-vrar Dardanelles policy hy denouncing
her peace pact of 1925 with Turkey and demanding strategic bases
on the Straits zone itself. At the Potsdam meeting of the Big
Three, no agreement on the Straits question could be reached
except that each was to communicate separately with Turkey on
the matter. The American proposals of November, 1945, accepted
by Turkey, favored revision of the Montreux Convention but only
of a minor or technical sort. In August, 1946, the Soviet Union
presented proposals for sharing control of the Straits vfith
Turkey, only to be met by curt refusals by Britain, the United
States, and Turkey. The Soviet government, not so easily dis-
couraged, again requested her share of control in September,
at the same time warning Turkey against relying on the help of
other great ppv/ers. This note, too, vras answered by Britain an(,
the United States, which felt that the preliminary steps of
separate interchanges with Turkey were definitely closed. The
Soviet Union hinted that a new conference for revision would no1
reach any’ decision pleasing to her. At the end of 1946, the
problem was still unsolved; the Soviet Union, forced into silence
momentarily, was still brooding over her frustration, vdiile
the United States, Great Britain, and Turkey were equally deter*
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The solution of this issue villl he difficult, and, at the
same time, extremely important. The Straits are one of the dan-
ger spots of the v7orld today; if this and other similar prohlemi
are not carefully dealt V7ith, they may lead to a third vrorld war
Internationalization would not he welcomed hy either the Soviet
Union or Turkey, at least not until all other such v:ate3rvays
have been internationalized. Control hy the Soviet Union throu^^i
vrar or some sort of political compromise about the whole Mediter
ranean area looks probable. Ho7;ever, if the Soviet Union could
be convinced that the Straits are not necessary for her security,
either through genuine cooperation among the great powers or by
a United Nations having some ruling power , sacrificed to it by
the nations of the v;orld, she might relinguish her one of her
oldest imperialistic objectives.
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APPENDIX
CONWEimON KFCO^RDING THE REGIME OF THE STRAITS
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APPEIMDIX
coinI/eI'Tion regahding the keguvE of the straits
Signed at ..ontreiox, July 20, 1936
His Ivlajesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of
French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ire-
land and the British Dominion heyondithe Seas, Emperor of India,
His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, His Majesty the Emperor
of Japan, His Majesty the King of Roumania, the President of
the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Soviet Republics, and His Rlajesty the
King of Yugoslavia;
Desiring to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits
of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus com-
prised under the general term "Straits” in such manner as to
safeguard, ^vithin the framev/ork of Turkish security and of. the
security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States, the prin-
ciple enshrined in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed at
Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923;
Have resolved to replace by the present Convention the
Convention signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923,..
,
Article 1
The High Contracting Parties recognise and affirra the
principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the
Straits
.
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"by the provisions of the present Convention.
Section 1-Merchant Vessels
Article 2
In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete
freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by
night, under any flag and v;ith any kind of cargo, •'ithout any
formalities, except as provided in article 3 belov7. No taxes
or charges other tiian those authorised by Annex I to the pre-
sent Convention shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on
these vessels when passing in transit without calling at a port
in the Straits,
In order to facilate the collection of these taxes or
charges merchant vessels passing through the Straits shall
communicate to the officials at the stations referred to in
article 3 their name, nationality, tonnage, destination and
last port of call (provenance)
.
Pilotage and towage optional.
Article 3
All ships entering the Straits by the Aegean Sea or b^'"
the Black Sea shall stop at a sanitary station near the entranco
to the Straits for the purposes of the sanitary control pre-
scribed by Turkish lav7 within the framev/ork of international
sanitary regulations. This control, in the case of ships pos-
sessing a clean bill of health or presenting a declaration of
health testifying that they dOd not fall within the scope of
of the provisions of the second paragraph of the present article
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i
Vessels which have .on board cases of plague, cholera,
yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or smallpox, or which have
had such cases on board during the previous seven days
,
and
vessels v/hich hace left an infected port ’-.dthin less than five
times twenty-four hours shall stop at the sanitary stations in-
dicated in the preceding paragraph in order to embark such sani •
tary guards as the Turkish authorities may direct. No tax or
charge shall be levied in respect of these sanitary guards and
they shall be disembarked at a sanitary station on departure
from the Straits.
Article 4
In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, merchant
vessels ,nnnder any flag or with any kind of cargo, shall enjoy
freedon of transit and navigation in the Straits subject to the
provisions of articles Sfand 3,
Pilotage and tov/age remain optional.
Article 5
In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, merchant vessel^;
not belonging to a coimtry at war v/ith Turkey shall enjoy free-
dom of transit and navigation in the Straits on condition that
they do not in any v/ay assist the enemy.
Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their tran-
sit shall be effected by the route which shall in each case be
• s
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indicated by the Turkish authorities.
Article 6
Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened ”dth im-
minent danger of war, the provisions of article 2 shall never-
theless continue to be applied except that vessels must enter
the Straits by day and that their transit must be effected by
the route which shall, in each case, be indicated by the Turkisl:
authorities
.
Pilotage may, in this case, be made obligatory, but no
charge shall be levied.
Article 7
The term "merchant vessels" applies to all vessels which
are not covered by Section II of the present Convention,
Section II—Vessels of War
Article 8
For the purposes of the present Convention, the definitioij
of vessels of war and of their specification together with thosq
relating to the calculation of tonnage shall be as set forth in
Annex II to the present Convention.
Article 9
Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed for the car-t
riage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid, shall not be subject to thej
provisions of article 13 regarding notification, nor shall they
be counted for the piirpose of calculating the tonnage which is
subject to limitations under articles 14 and 18, on condition
that they shall pass through the Straits singly. They ^all,
>,
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hov/ever, contimie to be on the same footing as vessels of vrar fcjp
the purpose of the remaining provisions governing transit.
The auxiliary vessels specified in the preceding paragraph
shall only be entitled to benefit by the exceptional status thei{|-
in contemplated if their armament does not include : for use
against floating targets, more than tvjo gims of a maximum calibi|e
of 105 millimetres; for use against aerial targets, more than tvo
guns of a maximum calibre of 75 millimetres.
Article 10
In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vesselsj
and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-
Black Sea pov;ers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom
of transit through the Straits v/ithout any taxes or charges
whatever, provided that such transit is begun during daylight anjd
subject to the conditions laid dovm in article 13 and the articljps
following thereafter.
Vessels of war other than those ''/hich fall within the cate-
gories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a
right of transit under the special conditions provided by arti-
cles 11 and 12.
Article 11
Black Sea Bowers may send through the Straits capital ships
of attonnage greater than that laid dov.m in the first paragraph
of article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through the
Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers,
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Black Sea Pov/ers shall have the right to send through the
Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their base, submarines
constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea, provided that
adequate notice of the laying down or purchase of such subma-
rines shall have been given to Turkey*
Submarines belonging toe the said Po'. *ers shall also be en-
titled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in doclcyards
outside the Black Sea on condition that detailed information on
the matter is given to Turkey.
In either case, the said submarines must travel by day an(,
on the surface, and must pass through the Straits singly.
Article 13
The transit of vessels of v/ar through the Straits shall b(
preceded by a notification given to the Turkish Government thro-
ugh the diplomatic channel. The normal period of notice shall
be eight days; but is desirable that in the case of non-Black
Sea Powers this period should be increased to fifteen days. The
notification shall specify the destination, name, type and num-
ber of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outvjard
passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any change
of date shall be subject to three days^ notice.
Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall take
place within a period of five days from the date given in the
orginal notification. After the expiry of this period, a nev/
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notification shall he given under the same conditions as for tl
original notification,
V/hen effecting transit, the commander of the naval force
shall, v;ithout being under any obligation to stop, communicate
to a signal station at the entrance to the Dardanelles or the
Bosphorus the exact composition of the force under his orders.
Article 14
The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces
which may in course of transit through the Straits shall not
exceed 15,000 tons, except in the cases provided for in article
11 and in Annex III to the present Convention.
The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall not,
however, comprise more than nine vessels.
Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea
Powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits, in accordance
with ther provisions of article 17, shall not be included in this
tonnage.
Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage
during their passage through the Straits be included in this
tonnage; such vessels, v/hile undergoing repair, shall be subject




Vessels of v/ar in transit through the Straits shall in no
circumstances make use of any aircraft v/hich they may be carry-
ing.
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Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall not,
except in the event of damage or peril of the sea, re:nain there-
in longer than is necessary for them to effect the passage.
Article 17
Nothing in the provisions of the preceding articles shall
prevent a naval force of any tonnage or composition from paying
a courtesy visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits,
at the invitation of the Turkish Government. Any such force
must leave the Straits by the same route as that by which it
entered, unless it fulfills the conditions required for passage
in transit through the Straits as laid down by articles 10, 14,
and 18.
Article 18
(1) The aggregate tonnage v/hich non-Black Sea Powers may
have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited as follows
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the aggre-
gate tonnage of the said Powers shallnnot exceed 30,000 tons;
- ) ,T
(b) If at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in
the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10,000 tons the tonnage
of the strongest fleet in that sea at the sate of the signature
of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of 30,000 tons
mentioned in paragraph (a) shall be increased by the same amount!,
up to a maximum of 45,000 tons. For this purpose, each Black
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vention, inform the Turkish Government, on the 1st January and
the 1st July of each year, of the total tonnage of its fleet in
the Black Sea; and the Turkish Government shall transmit this
informationsto the other High Contracting Parties and to the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations.
(Q) The tonnage v/hich any one non-Black Sea Pov;er may havd
in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of the aggregatr
tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a I and (b) above;
(d) In the event, hov.^ever, of one or more non-Black Sea
Powers desiring to send naval forces into the Black Sea, for a
himianitarian purpose, the said forces, v^hich shall in no case
exceed 8,000 tons altogether, shall be allowed to enter the Blac
Sea without having to give the notification provided for in ar-
ticle 13 of the present Convention, provided an authorisation
is obtained from the Turkish Government in ’ thegfollowing circum-
stances: if the figure of the aggregate tonnage specified in
paragra|ihs (a) and (B) above has not reached and v/ill not be
exceeded by the despatch of the forces which it is desired to
send, the Turkidh Government shall grant the said authorisation
within the shortest possible time after receiving the request
which has been addressed to it; if the said figure had already
been reached of if the despatch of the forces vrhlch it is desirec
to send will cause it ito be exceeded, the Turkish Government will
immediately inform the other Black Sea Powers of the request for
authorisation, and if the said Powers make no objection within
twenty-four hours of having received this infomation, the Turkj
k
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Government shall, v/ithin forty-eight hours at the latest, infon.
the interested Pov/ers of the reply v/hich its has decided to
make to their request.
Any furthur entry into the Black Sea of Naval forces of
non-Black Sea Powers shall only he effected within the available
limits of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a)
and (b) above.
(2) Vessels of v/ar belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall
not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, v/hatever
be the object of their presence there.
Article 19
In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, v;arships
shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation through
the Straits under the same conditions as those laid dovm in Ar-
ticles 10 to 18.
Vessels of v/ar belonging to belligerent Powers shall not,
however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising out oi
the application of article 25 of the present Convention, and in
cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in
virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, conclu-
ded v/ithin the framework of the Covenant of the League of Natior
and registered and published in accordance with the provisions
of Article 18 of the Covenant.
In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding
paragraph, the limitations laid dovm in articles 10 to 18 of the
present Convention shall not be an-plicable.
s 9
tv
• ’ j ' /**
v=rf:
rtf>
<fnotiii 9ff,t ^J3 STf/orf fitilcfJiv/ cJjiemaTsvoO J






lo 3 9 0*101 lo 08c JxOiBXcI' ocfn/ vicfne ir/Jd-TT/'t vnA
I
!'
pX£ft;Xi:BVfi e:l,j- r[ix^;^iv; b3^o.?l:l9 o<f ^Xii^ IXar'^ 3*if>vro'-l saS .'iof?Xff-non I





XXorf3 boB >:oBX.-~i;on oX anX^ncXorf ±/nv lo el.>a^9Y (2)
,^xab ^ao^-vpiac'":} nBifd' o^’-oirr jsaS oloi?15 9iU’ xii xiix;' cfou
'













8 q.' ': 8xxr/' ix.-i -f ^sxJiacf :foa YoofiirT Id 3fuxJ nl \
rfaroT:':;?- nqiXxaXv/^^f ctpsntizd- lo moLoei'r ©Xslquioo Yoc^re XX-dii
f t
,
-'I., ftx rr. *oI bx.^I O '-oXx 8x onoixf ib.'ioo eniBS erlct T:9te/ s-Vxj'.ij-’J orf^ 1 .





. 3X 0 .x OX 39Xo.fq
1 j to/t- li-jiH P.19,-0'X ^ 110*1 or* X II 9" f oj :y. ^a^ioXoI ‘XfiV/- lo sXo^sp.sV / ^O*;-
lo d-/ro r^niai'ix socso ax d'qooxe adiBa.to srld rir/roT d 38Bq ,*ioTe;->*od pV
^ nl. 5ao ,aoidC0VKoO d-ae39*:j arlc^ lo o'i'' oloxlio lo aox tQo;-Xcrci;fl 9/id-
'.
.. I , ,
;! nl aox .9 39'rTi 5},e ro icKTotv ojBd-3 a oc dsaoInoT ooi:BJxj.889 lo 3 ;3 jeo .-
., -uXoroo ,T9:l'.ar?
-^alfiaxcr oorro^slrax lo "io or/jiiv
lo rirafisJ orf.t lo la/.aovoO orfd Id' :f'icwo;'x*ri: edd- aind-x’- befv
-;-|-'Bnol 3 ivo';;: odd ddivr oonjxbTOOOi; ai bodsxX-fx/q buo bo-rede |- ',9*1 bjiP
.dntaovco odd lo SX oXoIdx.
. lo '!







n/ixlooeic add ex “lol bobivol' obebo Xxuio
I
dq©or 0 odd rrl












Notwithstanding the Prohibition of passage laid down in Para-
graph S above, vessels of v/ar belonging to belligerent Powers
v:hether they are Black Sea Pov/ers or not, v/hich have become
separated from their bases, may return thereto.
Vessels of vmr belonging to belligerent Powers shall not
make any capture, exercise the right of visit and search, or
carry out any hostile act in the Straits.
Article 20
In time of v;ar, Turkey being belligerent, the provisions
of article 10 to 18 shall not be applicable; the passage of
warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkis
Government.
Article 21
Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with im-
minent danger of war she shall have the right to apply the pro-
visions of article 20 of the present Convention.
Vessels which have passed through the Straits before Tur-
key has made use of the powers conferred upon her by the pre-
ceding paragraph, and which thus find themselves separated fron
their bases may return thereto. It is, however, understood
that Turkey may deny this right to vessels of war belonging to
the State v/hose attitude has given rise to the application of
the present article.
Should the Turkish Government make use of the powers con-
ferred by the first paragraph of the present article, a notifi-
cation to that effect shall be addressed to the High Contractir
h
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Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations,
If the Council of the League of Nations shall decide hy
a majority of two-thirds that the measures thus taken hy Turkey
are not justified, and if such should also he the opinion of the
majority of the High Contracting Parties signatories to the Pre
sent Convention, the Turkish Government undertakes to discontini
the measures in question aa also any measures V7hich may have
been taken been taken under article 6 of the present Convention
Article 22
Vessels of v/ar which have on hoard cases of plague, choleiHa
yellow fever, exanthematic typhus or smallpox or which have had
such cases on hoard within the last seven days and vessels of wa
which have left an infected port within less than five times twe
nty-four hours must pass through the Straits in quarantine and
apply hy the means on hoard such prophylactic measures as are




In order to assure the passage of civil aircraft hetiveen
the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish Government will
indicate the air routes available for this purpose, outside the
forbidden zones v;hich may he established in the Straits. Civil
aircraft may use these routes provided that they give the Tur-
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of three days, and as regards flights on regular services, a gen-
eral notification of the dates of passage.
The Turkish Governnent moreover undertake, notwithstanding
any remilitarisation of the Straits, to furnish the necessary
facilities for the safe passage of civil aircraft authorised un-
der the air regulations in force on Turkey to fly across Turkish
territory between Europe and A4ia. The route which is to be fol-
lowed in the Straits zone by aircraft which have obtained an au-
thorisation shall be indicated from time to time.
Section IV General Provisions
Article 24
The functions of the International Commission set up undeS
the Convention relating to the regime of the Straits of the 24th
Itily, 1923, are hereby transferred to the Tur*kish Government,
The Turkish Government undertake to collect statistics and
to furnish information concerning the application of articles 11,
12, 14, and 18 of the present Convention.
They v/ill supervise the execution of all the provisions of
the present Convention relating to the passage of vessels of war
through the Straits.
As soon as they have be^hi'hotlif ied of the intended passage
through the Straits of a foreign naval force the Turkish Govern-
ment shall inform the representatives at Angora of the High Con-
tracting Parties of the composition of that force, its tonnage,
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the prohahle date of its retiirn.
The Turkish Government shall address to the Secretary-Gen
eral of the League of Nations and to the High Contracting Parties
an annual report giving details regarding the movement of foreign
vessels of v/ar through the Straits and furnishing all informatiqn
vrhich may be of service to commerce and navigation, both by sea
and by air, for v/hich provision is made in the present Convent!
Article 25
Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the rig
and obligations of Turkey, or of any of the other High Contrac
ting Parties members of the League of Nations.
Section V Final Provisions
Article 26
The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possi
The ratifications shall be deposited in the archives of tl
Government of the French Republic in Paris.
The Japanese Government shall be entitled to inform the
Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic repre
in Paris that the ratification has been given, and in that case
they shall transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as
possible.
A procfes-verbal of the deposit of ratifications shall be
drav/n up as soon as six instriraents of ratification, including
that of Turkey, shall have been deposited. For this purpose the
notification provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be
taken as the equivalent of the denosit of an instrument of rati-
\le,
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The present Convention shall come into force on the date
of the said •b&66^s-verhal .
The French Government will transmit to all the High Con-
tracting Parties an authentic copy of the proc^s-verbaX providejp
for in the preceding paragraph and of the uroc j-s-verbaux: of
the deposit of any subsequent ratifications.
Article 27
The present Convention shall, as from the date of its en-
try into force, be open to accession by any Pov:er signatory to
the Treaty of Peace at Lausanne signed on the 24th July, 1923.
Each accession shall be notified, through the diplomatic
channel, to the Government of the French Republic, and by the
latter to all the High Contracting Parties.
Accessions shall come into force as from the date of noti
fications to the French Governi^ient
.
Article 28
The present Convention shall remain in force for twenty
years from the date of its entry into force.
The principle of freedom of transit and navigation affim
ed in article 1 of the present Convention shall however continue
v/ithout limit of time.
If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of
twenty years, no High Contracting Party shkll have given notice
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shall hov/ever continue in force until two ^rears after such no-
tice shall have been given. Any such notice shall he communi-
cated hy the French Government to the High Contracting Parties.
In the event of the present Convention being denounced in
accordance with the provisions of the present article, the High
Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference for
the purpose of concluding a new Convention.
Article 29
At the expiry of each period of five years from the date
of the entry into force of the present Convention each of the
High Contracting Parties shall be entitled to initiate a pro-
posal for amending one or more of the provisions of the present
Convention.
To be valid, any request for revision formulated by one of
the High Contracting Parties must be supported, in the case of
modifications to articles 14 or 18, by one other High Contractinj^
Party, and, in the case of modifications to any other article,
by two other High Contracting Parties.
Any request for revision thus supported must be notified
to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to the
expiry of the current period of five years. This notification
shall contain details of the proposed amendments and the reasons
which have given rise to them.
Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on
these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High Con-
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tracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference to be
sninraoned for this purpose.
Such a conference may only take decisions by a unanimous
vote, except as regards cases of revision involving articles
14 and 18, for v/hich a majority of three-quarters of the High
Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.
The said majority shall include three-quarters of the Higl
Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turke3 .
J^X
,.,T "• ^
: f “ ..^J.
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